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Article
Private Advantage and Public Power:
Reexamining the Expectation and





Fifty years ago Fuller and Perdue asked why it is that in cases of
breach of contract courts usually award "expectation" damages rather
than "reliance" damages.I The authors defined these damages measures
by their purposes.2 The object of the expectation measure "is to put the
plaintiff in as good a position as he would have occupied had the defend-
ant performed his promise."'3 The object of the reliance measure, on the
other hand, is to "undo the harm" caused by reliance on a promise that
was later broken, that is, "to put [the plaintif] in as good a position as he
was in before the promise was made."'4 Fuller and Perdue concluded
* Professor of Law, Boston University. A.B. 1965, Bowdoin College; J.D. 1971, Uni-
versity of Chicago.
1. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. I & 2), 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37).
2. See id. at 52-53.
3. Id. at 54.
4. Id. I prefer to define the reliance measure as the attempt to put the plaintiff in the
position he would have occupied had he not contracted with the defendant. My preference for
this language over the definition offered by Fuller and Perdue is that focusing on the "status
quo ante" may cause us to overlook the harm resulting from opportunities lost by the plaintiff
by reason of the defendant's promise. See infra text accompanying notes 10- 11. It should be
pointed out, however, that Fuller and Perdue themselves recognized that lost opportunities are
an important form of reliance loss. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 55, 60.
The object of the third measure (restitution) is "the prevention of gain by the defaulting
promisor at the expense of the promisee; more briefly, the prevention of unjust enrichment."
Id. at 54. This Article is concerned primarily with a comparison of the expectation and reli-
ance measures, and does not explore the uses of the restitution measure. For a recent discus-
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that the strongest reason for protecting the expectation interest is that, as
a practical matter, it is the best way to protect the reliance interest. In
other words, protection of the expectation interest is not actually the
goal, but merely the best means of protecting and promoting reliance. 5
In the more recent past, commentators have advanced economic
and moral arguments to support expectation protection as the desired
goal of contract damages, and not simply as the best means of protecting
reliance. Most recently, Melvin Eisenberg, alone6 and with Robert
Cooter,7 has staked out something of a middle ground, arguing that reli-
ance protection is an important, but not exclusive, justification for expec-
tation damages.
This Article concludes that all the arguments that have been offered
to justify the expectation principle independently of reliance protection
are unpersuasive. This conclusion is based on a close analysis of the con-
cepts of expectation and reliance and the difference between the two
ideas. Section I of the Article attempts to demonstrate that the only
expectation loss not covered by the reliance measure is the loss of what I
call the "extra advantage" that the promisee would have received from
the defaulting promisor's performance beyond what he would have re-
ceived from any other contracting party. What follows from this obser-
vation depends not upon logic, but upon one's political and moral values.
I conclude for my own part that public power should not be used to
enforce the private advantage of expectation unless there is some compel-
ling reason to do so. In other words, the burden of proof should be on
the party seeking to employ state power. Unless it can be shown that
protecting the expectation interest will make us richer or more just or
more free, we should stop after we have protected the reliance interest.
In the next section, the Article, like the Fuller and Perdue article
fifty years ago, examines contemporary arguments for expectation pro-
tection as the goal itself, rather than merely as the means to achieve the
goal of reliance protection. Although current moral and economic argu-
ments may be more sophisticated than those addressed by Fuller and
Perdue, they still do not make a convincing case for going beyond com-
pensation for loss in order to effectuate gain.
But what if we are faced with the somewhat unusual situation in
which reliance loss exceeds lost expectation? Should we then make ex-
sion of the restitution and expectation interests, see Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The
Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339 (1985).
5. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 60-62.
6. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982).
7. Cooter & Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1432 (1985).
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pectation rather than reliance the presumptive choice? Would choosing
expectation here betray an inconsistency in approach? Section III ex-
plores these questions.
Section IV moves from the theoretical to a more practical realm,
and explores the best method for achieving the goal of reliance protec-
tion. The difficulties of measuring true reliance loss tend to support the
conclusion of Fuller and Perdue that the expectation measure usually is
the best way to protect the reliance interest. The Article suggests, how-
ever, three types of situations in which courts should consider departing
from the expectation measure.
I. Distinguishing the Concepts of Expectation and Reliance
As defined by Fuller and Perdue, the expectation and reliance meas-
ures attempt to do two different things. Expectation seeks to approxi-
mate performance of the promise, and reliance seeks to remove all effects
of the promise and its breach. But two factors cloud the apparently clear
distinction between the two measures. First, the loss of an expected bene-
fit itself usually involves some reliance loss. If I promise my children a
trip to an amusement park and then repudiate my promise a minute
later, they will feel worse than if I had not mentioned the trip at all.8 To
undo all the harm caused by my broken promise, I would have to com-
pensate them for the unhappiness and sense of injury I caused when I
created an expectation and then destroyed it.9
8. Most of the discussion in this Article concerns exchange promises made in the busi-
ness or commercial setting. The reason for this emphasis is that it is generally believed that the
commercial exchange promise provides the strongest case for the expectation measure, see,
e.g., Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1459-75; Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 743-44, 799;
Fuller & Perdue, supra note I, at 62-63, 373, and I want to address the strongest arguments for
expectation damages. Nevertheless, the example of my promise to my children is an in-
trafamilial gift promise that is about as far removed from a commercial exchange as is possi-
ble. I have departed from the commercial setting to use this example because it illustrates
more clearly the "psychological harm" problem. See id. at 57-58. This type of psychological
harm would seem to be less of a concern in a commercial exchange setting.
9. Fuller and Perdue argue that compensation for psychological harm cannot explain
protection of the expectation interest because psychological harm attends all broken promises,
but the law does not award expectation damages for all broken promises. Fuller & Perdue,
supra note 1, at 57-58. Notice, however, that even a traditional expectation award would not
completely eliminate the psychological harm problem, although it would usually reduce the
problem substantially. In the example, even if I give in and bring my children to the amuse-
ment park or take them somewhere else that they like as much, they will have suffered some
disappointment that they would not have experienced if I had simply kept my promise in the
first place. Bringing them to the park will not completely compensate them for their tempo-
rary disappointment, although, once they go to the park, they probably will not dwell on the
repudiation that occurred between the time of the promise and the time of performance. My
point here is simply that full protection of the reliance interest (te., placing the promisee in the
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Although it may be possible to compensate fully for this kind of
disappointment without providing the equivalent of full performance, at-
tempting to do so poses intractable measurement problems. Once I have
promised my children the amusement park trip, they will say that noth-
ing will satisfy them but a trip to the amusement park or something else
that they like as much as that trip. But actually going to the amusement
park will put them in a better position (in their view) than if I never had
made the promise. Measuring the reliance loss requires answering the
awkward and unsatisfactory question-for what price would my children
be willing to suffer a broken promise to go to the amusement park? The
mere mention of the park will start them howling to go there. This
homespun example suggests that the psychological harm accompanying
disappointed expectations can make it difficult, if not impossible, to
quantify the difference between the theoretical concepts of expectation
and reliance; it does not suggest, however, that the two concepts are the
same.
The second complication in distinguishing the concepts of expecta-
tion and reliance emerges from the recognition that reliance loss may
include lost opportunities as well as out-of-pocket losses and expendi-
tures. 10 If, because of your promise, I lose an opportunity to earn a $100
profit from another contract, I must recover $100 in damages (dis-
counted according to the probability of realizing that opportunity)11 to
be placed in the same position I would have been in had you not made
your promise. This lost opportunity fits the Fuller and Perdue definition
of reliance just as well as does money spent by the promisee in reliance
on the fulfillment of the promise.
In fact, both the expectation measure and the reliance measure in-
volve the concept of lost opportunity. Lost expectation encompasses the
value of the opportunity that was created by the formation of the con-
tract and was then lost by its breach. Reliance loss includes the value of
an opportunity that existed apart from the contract and was then lost by
formation of the contract. In other words, one way to think about the
position he would have been in had there been no promise) would require compensation for the
sense of injury or disappointment caused by a breach of promise.
10. Fuller and Perdue recognize that the concept of reliance loss includes forgone oppor-
tunities. See id. at 55, 60; see also Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173, 399 A.2d 1374
(1979); Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1440-41; Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 744 n.10;
Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YAi.E L.J.
1261, 1269 (1980).
11. Such discounting is necessary as a theoretical matter to avoid placing the promisee in
a better position than he would have been in had the promisor made no promise. I will argue
later, however, that as a practical matter there should be a presumption against this discount-
ing. See infra note 136.
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distinction between the expectation and reliance measures is to distin-
guish the causes of expectation and reliance losses. Expectation losses
are caused by the breach of a promise: but for the breach there would be
no expectation loss.12 Since the expectation measure is a measure of
damages for breach of contract, it seems to be a statement of the obvious
that the cause of the damages was the breach.
What may not be obvious is that most reliance losses are not caused
by breach, even though we speak of reliance damages as an alternative
remedy for breach of contract. 13 Opportunities lost because of reliance
on a contract, as well as most out-of-pocket reliance expenditures, result
from the formation of a contract, but not from its breach. 14 These losses
would have occurred even if the defaulting party had fully performed
her 15 contractual obligations. The nondefaulting party incurred these
losses before the time of breach with no expectation of reimbursement;
rather, he hoped that the sum of these losses would be less than the sum
of the gains he would receive from the other party's performance.
Although we can say that'the subsequent breach provides the occasion
for the recovery of these reliance losses (and that the breach caused the
award of reliance damages), we cannot say that the breach caused the
losses. 16
Although reliance and expectation involve different lost opportuni-
ties, sometimes the two opportunities may be of equal value to the prom-
12. Of course, for a promise to be broken, it must be made in the first place. In this sense,
it might be more accurate to say that expectation losses are caused by the making and subse-
quent breaking of a promise. The point is simply that without a breach there is no expectation
loss.
13. Reliance losses not caused by breach include: 1) opportunities forgone by choosing to
enter into the contract, and 2) out-of-pocket expenditures made before breach occurs. Since
expectation damages are limited to damages caused by breach, these items are not recoverable
under an expectation measure.
Some reliance losses are caused by breach. For example, litigation costs are incidental to
breach and must be recovered to put the promisee in the position he would have occupied had
there been no contract. Some damages suffered as a consequence of breach of warranty can
constitute reliance losses. Fuller and Perdue cite the case of the sale of a cow, warranted to be
free from disease, that infects the buyer's whole herd. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 75.
These incidental and consequential damages caused by breach must be recovered to protect
either the expectation interest or the reliance interest. See infra note 119 for the Uniform
Commercial Code definitions of incidental and consequential damages.
14. See Kinzley v. United States, 661 F.2d 187, 193 (Ct. Cl. 1981), for one court's recog-
nition and discussion of this point.
15. For purposes of clarity, throughout this Article I use the masculine pronoun to refer
to the plaintiff-promisee and the feminine pronoun to refer to the defendant-promisor.
16. 1 am talking here about causation in a factual sense, not in a legal sense. The test of
causation in fact is often stated as the "but for" test. But for ,4, B would not have happened.
See infra note I11.
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isee. If the promisee had two identical opportunities, and flipped a coin
to choose the contract with the defendant-promisor, then the reliance
and expectation losses would be the same. In other words, if the value of
the forgone opportunity equals the value of the contract opportunity, the
promisee must recover the full value of the defendant's promised per-
formance to be placed in the same position that he would have been in
had the defendant made no promise.
Under what circumstances will the forgone opportunity equal the
contract opportunity? Professor Eisenberg has provided a helpful explo-
ration of this question in a recent article.17 Briefly stated, Eisenberg's
answer is that when promises are made in a perfect market-that is, a
market with such characteristics as complete information, continuity,
depth, and homogeneous commodities-the promisee is indifferent about
whom he deals with; every contract in the perfect market is identical.18
Of course, few, if any, markets are perfect. To the extent that the prom-
isee has a reason to choose a particular promisor, the expectation loss
will exceed the reliance loss.
The difference, then, between the expectation interest and the reli-
ance interest is the difference in value to the plaintiff of (1) the contract
he formed with the defendant and (2) the alternative contract (if any) the
plaintiff would have formed with someone else had he not contracted
with the defendant. It is in this sense that the expectation interest is said
to give the promisee the "benefit of the bargain."
Professor Eisenberg suggests that one reason for awarding expecta-
tion damages is to give effect to the parties' allocation of the risk of price
changes. He asserts that considerations of efficiency and fairness nor-
mally support effectuating this allocation, "and that is just what is done
by expectation damages." 19 But the difference between expectation and
reliance damages is not that expectation gives effect to the allocation of
risk of price changes and reliance does not. To illustrate, consider the
following hypothetical used by Eisenberg: a buyer breaks a contract for
purchase from a dealer of a quantity of standard typing paper for
$4000.20 Assume that the market price2' on the date that seller learns of
17. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 785-98. Cooter and Eisenberg extend Eisenberg's earlier
analysis, using more formal methods of economic analysis. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 7.
at 1444-59.
18. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 746-47.
19. Id. at 787.
20. See id. at 791.
21. Professor Eisenberg uses the broader term "replacement price," which he defines as
"the price payable under a substitute contract." Id. at 788. Replacement price may be estab-
lished by market price or by actual substitute purchase (cover price) or substitute sale (resale
[Vol. 38
March 1987] CONTRACT DAMAGES
the breach 22 is $3500. Assume also that the forgone price 23 is the same
($4000) as the contract price (as Eisenberg suggests would be the case for
homogeneous goods like standard typing paper).24 In this case, the ex-
pectation measure (contract price minus market price) and the reliance
measure (forgone price minus market price) are the same ($500).
What happens when the forgone price diverges from the contract
price? Assume that the contract price is $4000 but the forgone price is
$3800.25 In this case, expectation damages still would be $500 ($4000
minus $3500) but reliance damages would be only $300 ($3800 minus
$3500).26 Which figure represents the amount of market movement?
The answer depends upon whether the contract price ($4000) or the for-
gone price ($3800) is considered to be the market figure at the time of
contract formation. The choice depends on one's definition of market
price and perhaps on the facts of the particular case. For example, if the
seller is selling a unique good, one might define the market price as the
amount of the highest bid; on the other hand, if the object of the sale is
not unique (as in the typing paper example), one might conclude that the
buyer's offer to pay $200 more than he would have to pay elsewhere
reflects an error by the buyer about what the true market price is.27
Although the problem is a definitional one, it seems sensible to think
of the risk of market movement as the risk that price conditions in-
price). I am assuming here that the seller did not resell, and thus I am employing the market
price.
22. Eisenberg argues that "replacement price" (in our example, market price) should be
the price, on the date the innocent party learns of the breach, for delivery on the date specified
in the original contract. He recognizes that the U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (1978) would measure the
replacement price "at the time and place for tender." Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 788 n.126.
Making the time that the innocent party learns of the breach the crucial time for determining
damages seems to be consistent with both the theoretical concepts of expectation and reliance
and the duty of the innocent party to mitigate damages.
23. Eisenberg defines "forgone price" as "the best price that was available from an alter-
native buyer or seller on the date of the contract (or, in appropriate cases, between the contract
date and the breach date)." Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 788.
24. Under Eisenberg's assumptions of a perfect market and homogeneous goods, the for-
gone price and the contract price are the same. See id. at 789.
25. Presumably, in a perfect market with perfect information, the forgone price would
never diverge from the contract price. In the real world, however, contract prices can diverge
from existing market prices even when the market generally is functioning fairly well. In our
example, the seller is getting a better price ($4000) from this particular buyer than he could
have obtained elsewhere ($3800).
26. Expectation damages are $500 because the seller would have received $4000 had the
buyer performed under the contract, but now the seller can get only $3500 for the paper.
Reliance damages are $300 because if there had been no contract with the buyer in the first
place the seller would have sold for $3800. Now he can get only $3500.
27. See generally R. PERLMAN, THEORY OF MARKETS 2-7 (1972); J. SINDEN & A. WOR-
RELL, UNPRICED VALUES: DECISIONS WITHOUT MARKET PRICES 43-45 (1979).
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dependent of the contract will change.28 The market price at the time
the seller learned of the breach (in our example, $3500) is determined
primarily without regard to the price established by the contracting par-
ties; it is set by what others are willing to pay at that time. If the market
price of typing paper at the time of contract formation similarly is deter-
mined independently of the contract price agreed to by this particular
buyer and seller, the reliance measure (in the example, $300), not the
expectation measure ($500), serves as the allocator of the risk of market
movement. The extra $200 included in the expectation award represents
the amount by which the contract price of the typing paper exceeded the
market price of such paper at the time the parties formed the contract.
Thus, the risk that is allocated by the expectation measure, and not by
the reliance measure, is the risk that the contract price differs from the
existing market price. Under an expectation measure, the seller bears the
risk that the contract price is less than the market price, and the buyer
bears the risk that the contract price is greater than the market price.
2 9
This risk is not the risk of market movement, but rather the risk of "mar-
ket deviation.
' '30
The typing paper example illustrates that when there is a function-
ing market for the subject matter of the contract we may conclude that
the forgone price is the market price at the time of contract formation.
But the difference between the expectation and reliance measures is the
difference between the contract price and the forgone price, and that is a
difference that can be determined without characterizing either price as a
"market price." Consider the following hypothetical involving an item
for which it may be difficult to denominate a "market value": A photog-
rapher goes to a road race and takes pictures of the runners as they cross
the finish line. After the race, he contacts the people whose pictures he
has taken and offers to sell them the pictures for $10 each. Assume that
one runner agrees to purchase a picture, but then repudiates her promise
shortly thereafter. Presumably in this case only the runner (and possibly
28. One of Eisenberg's criteria for a "perfectly competitive market" is that the market
share of each of the participants in the market is "so small that none can affect the commod-
ity's price." Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 746 & n.13 (citing E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS
196-97 (3d ed. 1979)).
29. If the forgone price exceeded the contract price in the example (e.g., the forgone price
was $4100), the expectation measure would fall short of allocating the risk of market move-
ment. The amount of the shortfall would be the amount by which the seller undersold the
market ($100). See infra section III.
30. Eisenberg makes a brief reference to "the risk of misjudgment of market value." Ei-
senberg, supra note 6, at 790. I prefer to use the phrase "market deviation" rather than "mar-
ket misjudgment" because it is broader and more neutral about the cause of the divergence
between contract price and market price.
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family members or friends of the runner) would pay any money at all for
this particular picture. The photographer has not lost any alternative op-
portunity to sell the picture. Reliance damages would cover only ex-
penditures incurred after the promise was made.31 Expectation damages
would be the $10 price, minus any developing and printing costs saved by
the photographer as a consequence of not having to perform his part of
the bargain. We do not have to identify the contract price ($10) or the
forgone price ($0), or any other price, as the "market price" to distin-
guish between the expectation and reliance measures. Whether the sub-
ject matter of the contract is a fungible commodity such as typing paper
or a unique item such as a photograph, the difference between the expec-
tation and reliance measures can be stated in the same terms. The differ-
ence is that only the expectation measure preserves for the plaintiff the
extra advantage he would have received from the defendant's perform-
ance beyond what he would have received from anyone else.
Once the nature of the distinction between the theoretical concepts
of expectation and reliance is understood, we can begin to ask which
measure should serve as the ideal goal of the law of contract remedies.
The proposition that the power of the state should protect at least the
reliance interest of a person who is the victim of a broken promise seems
to be relatively uncontroversial. Even here, however, there may be ex-
ceptions, such as when the promisor has a good reason for not keeping
her promise, or when the type of promise involved is deemed not to be
one of sufficient public concern, or when the harm is deemed to have
been avoidable by the promisee. But in cases of breach of exchange
promises without excuse, few would argue that the promisor should not
be forced at least to restore the promisee to the position he would have
occupied had the promisor not made and broken her promise. Although
philosophers may struggle with the question of why there is a moral obli-
gation to keep a promise,32 if you have injured someone by making and
31. Reliance expenditures made before the promise (cost of film, photographer's time and
lost opportunity to take someone else's picture, developing costs, if any) theoretically would
not be recoverable since they would have been made even if the runner had never made the
promise to buy. Some courts have awarded prepromise reliance, however. See, e.g., Hoffman
v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965); Anglia Television Ltd. v.
Reed, [1972] 1 Q.B. 60 (C.A. 1971). As a practical matter, if a court is unwilling or unable to
compensate the plaintiff for opportunities lost as a result of contracting with the defendant, it
may make sense at least to award compensation for precontractual expenditures on the
grounds that had the defendant not made her promise the plaintiff would have entered into an
alternative contract that would have covered his precontractual expenses.
32. A century ago, David Hume argued that "a promise wou'd not be intelligible, before
human conventions had establish'd it; and . . . even if it were intelligible, it wou'd not be
attended with any moral obligation." D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 516 (L.A.
March 1987] CONTRACT DAMAGES
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breaking a promise to him without excuse, the fact of injury itself can
supply a basis for a societally imposed obligation to make amends. If the
very reason that the promisor used the language of promise was to in-
duce reliance by the promisee, responsibility to protect the promisee
when the promisor's actions turned that reliance into injury seems
strong.
What is the justification for requiring the defaulting promisor to
protect the promisee's expectation interest? Why should the law force
her to pay to the promisee more money than is necessary to compensate
him for all loss suffered as a result of contracting with her? Why should
the law choose as its goal the monetary equivalent of full performance of
a contract that is more favorable to the promisee than any contract he
would have obtained elsewhere? As Fuller and Perdue33 and Eisen-
berg34 point out, protecting the promisee's expectation interest may be
the best way to protect his reliance interest. I will explore this idea in
section IV. But here, the question is whether there is justification for
making protection of the expectation interest the goal of contract reme-
dies rather than simply a means to achieve the goal of protecting
reliance.
Logic does not resolve the choice between reliance and expectation.
Complete protection of the promisee's reliance interest (including lost
opportunities) would mean compensation for all losses suffered by the
promisee by reason of the promisor's conduct from promise through
breach. If the starting point from which to measure loss is the promisee's
status at the time the promise was made, then reliance damages provide
full compensation, and expectation damages are supercompensatory.
But advocates of the expectation measure can also claim the compensa-
tion principle. If the starting point for measuring loss is the value of the
promise, then the expectation measure provides no more than exact com-
pensation for actual loss.
What should be the base level from which losses are measured? Ex-
pectation supporters can point out that it is the breach alone and not the
initial promise that is the wrong to be compensated for. If no wrong had
been committed (the promise had been kept), the promisee would have
been in, say, position X. Because of the wrong the promisee is in position
Y. Compensatory damages, therefore, should be X minus Y. Reliance
Selby-Bigge ed. 1888). Professor Fried reacts to Hume and provides an interesting discussion
of the nature and sources of the moral obligation to keep a promise in C. FRIED, CONTRACT
AS PROMISE 14-17 (1981).
33. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 60-62.
34. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1461; Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 787.
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supporters can reply that expectation is a strange kind of compensation
because in fact the promisee never actually occupied position X. Expec-
tation damages make the promisee better off than the promisee had ever
been before. By using the time of promise as the starting point we can
take account of the effect of all the actions of the promisor-you cannot
break a promise without making it first. Reliance supporters can argue
that their measure makes contract remedies consistent with tort reme-
dies, so that we have one compensation rule for breaches of civil obliga-
tions.35 Expectation advocates can counter that the presence of a
promise makes contract different from tort, and uniformity would mean
treating unequal things equally.
Although the choice between the expectation and reliance principles
cannot be resolved by purely analytic means, the analysis of the differ-
ence between the two measures helps to clarify what is and what is not at
stake in making the choice. That difference is what I have called the
"extra advantage" that the nondefaulting party would have received
from the defaulter beyond what he would have obtained elsewhere; the
contract may have provided for this extra advantage for many different
reasons. My own view is that implementation of this private advantage is
not a proper use of the power of the state.
Critics might respond that as long as no one has exploited an im-
proper advantage (for example, by exertion of vastly superior bargaining
power, deception, duress, or the like) there is no reason why the extra
advantage should not be enforced. My view is that, even when the bar-
gaining process displays no identifiable flaw, this kind of private advan-
tage should not become an object of state enforcement. There is no
doubt that my view reflects certain fundamental philosophical and polit-
ical biases. My conclusion reflects an underlying belief that, more often
than not, it is the stronger actors in our society who seek to employ state
power to enforce this privately negotiated "extra" advantage. 36 This be-
35. Professor Atiyah argues that contract damages are not unique in protecting expecta-
tions. He refers to the protection of future earnings and other forward-looking remedies in tort
law. But these tort remedies seem to me to be reliance-type awards even though they look to
the future. The question they address is how much money is needed to put the plaintiff in the
position he would have been in had there been no tort. To figure this amount, some predic-
tions about.the future are necessary. Expectation damages in contract, on the other hand,
uniquely seek to lock in the benefit promised by the defendant, making the plaintiff better off
than if there had been no promise in the first place. See Atiyah, Comments on Professor Wad-
dams' Paper, 8 CAN. Bus. L.J. 10, 14 (1983).
36. Atiyah and others have opined that "freedom of contract" helps the economically
strong at the expense of the weak. P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CON-
TRACT 648, 702 (1979) (citing Lord Diplock's opinion in A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co.
v. Macaulay, [1974] 3 All E.R. 616, 623 (H.L.)). See generally M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFOR-
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lief is certainly subject to intuitive challenge and empirical contradiction.
Even if one believes, as I do, that the case for expectation damages is
not self-justifying, certain instrumental arguments might be made to pro-
vide the necessary justification. For example, it could be argued that
expectation damages are necessary to ensure higher moral standards or
to provide society with economic benefits that would otherwise be lost.
In the next section, I consider some moral and economic arguments for
making protection of expectation the theoretical goal of contract reme-
dies. I will take up questions of implementation of this theoretical goal
in section IV.
II. Fuller and Perdue Revisited: Examining Arguments for the
Expectation Measure
Fuller and Perdue about a half-century ago examined and rejected
several suggested justifications for protecting the expectation interest of
the victim of a breach of contract. The authors concluded that the
strongest reason for employing the expectation measure of damages is
that, as a practical matter, it is the best way to protect the promisee's
reliance interest.37 In other words, protection of the expectation interest
is not justifiable as the goal of contract damages, but rather as the best
means of reaching the goal of protecting and promoting reliance on con-
tracts. Recently, however, scholars have offered new moral and eco-
nomic arguments in support of the expectation measure. This section
examines the case made in these arguments for expectation protection as
the goal of contract damages rather than merely as a means to protect
against reliance loss.
A. Expectation and Morality
In Contract as Promise, Professor Charles Fried argues that the law
should use full performance as the measure of damages because full per-
formance is what the promisor promised. 38 According to Fried, when an
individual imposes an obligation on herself, the law generally should en-
force that obligation according to its terms. A person who makes a
promise has a moral obligation to keep that promise; if she does not, it is
"fair" that she be made to provide either the promised performance or its
MATION OF AMERICAN LAW 186-211 (1977); Cohen, The Relationship of Contractual Reme-
dies to Political and Social Status: A Preliminary Inquiry, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 31 (1982);
Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943); Mensch,
Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753 (1981).
37. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 61-62.
38. C. FRIED, supra note 32, at 19.
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monetary equivalent. 39 This conclusion is based on Fried's belief that the
binding nature of a contract is rooted in the promise, not in the reliance.
The argument holds that if reliance is less than expectation, use of the
reliance measure excuses the promisor from her own voluntarily created
obligation to the extent of the deficiency. In Fried's view, the aim of the
law should be to hold people to their obligations because doing so is a
way of "taking seriously their capacity to determine their own values."
4
To let the promisor escape from fully meeting her obligation would mean
that we do not take her seriously as a person-we "infantilize" her.
41
Although Fried's argument seems to accord with a basic sense of
justice, especially when considered in the abstract, ultimately it fails to
establish a satisfactory moral basis for a general choice of expectation
damages. First of all, the question to be answered is not simply what is
the moral obligation of an individual who has made a promise. The
question is, rather, what should organized society require promisors to
do when they do not keep their promises. There is an important differ-
ence between what we should hope people would aspire to and what we
should force them to do.42 In addition, if the law of contract were to give
full effect to the moral argument that people should keep their promises,
the appropriate remedy would seem to be specific performance. If the
law not only permits but sometimes prefers the defaulting party to pay
money damages in lieu of performance, 43 the moral argument becomes
much less compelling. The morality of promise-keeping seems more rel-
evant to the choice between specific and substitutional relief than it does
39. Id. at 17.
40. / Id. at 20.
41. Id. at 21.
42. Lon Fuller refers to this conflict as the "morality of duty" and the "morality of aspi-
ration." L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5passim (rev. ed. 1969). See generally H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181-207 (1961). In a famous exchange of views, Fuller and
Hart debated the law and morality conflict. Hart wrote a defense of the positivist approach
which holds that there is always a distinction between "what is" and "what ought to be." See
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). Fuller,
however, disagreed that there is ever a complete break between law and morality. He argued
that "coherence and goodness have more affinity than coherence and evil." Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 636 (1958). This
affinity is what creates the internal "morality of order" which makes all law possible. So while
Fuller would recognize the conflict between the "morality of duty" and the "morality of aspi-
ration," he would not go to the positivist extreme of recognizing an amoral "what is" and a
moralistic "what ought to be." In any event, both schools recognize that there are limits on
how far law can go to implement the "morality of aspiration" or the world of "what ought to
be."
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, introductory note (1981); R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.8, at 106-07 (3d ed. 1986).
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to the choice among various damage measures. 44 Once the law deter-
mines that payment of money for broken promises will suffice, it is hard
to accept the claim that moral considerations dictate the amount of
money that must be paid.
Before reaching any conclusions about what remedy for breach of
promise is dictated by morality we might ask why the making of a prom-
ise gives rise to a moral obligation in the first place.45 If the answer is
that promisors have a moral obligation to keep their promises because
other people are often hurt by broken promises, then the moral obliga-
tion might extend only to the prevention or correction of that hurt.
Fried, however, argues that the ultimate basis for the moral obligation of
promise is not prevention of harm to others but respect for individual
autonomy and trust.
46
As Professor Macneil has pointed out, it is not certain a priori that
enforcing people's promises against their will increases the sum total of
personal autonomy.47 It seems even less obvious that enforcing promises
by means of the expectation measure will necessarily yield a net gain in
personal freedom. Perhaps more importantly, it is not clear why per-
sonal autonomy should be the single, or even the primary, moral crite-
rion. Fried argues that when the promisor seeks to be excused from
some or all of her promised performance, not only does the promisee
have no moral duty to accede to the promisor's request for relief but to
do so would violate the requirement of morality to take other people
seriously.48 Empathy, concern for others, and generosity of spirit appear
to have a subordinate place in Fried's analysis. My point is not that
people should always be willing to excuse others from their obligations
but rather that the moral question may be a complicated one involving
conflicting moral principles. The analysis of the morality of the parties'
conduct may depend to an important extent on the promisor's reasons
for seeking to escape full performance of her promise. In any event, I
find it hard to fault the conduct of a promisee who demands that the
promisor bear the responsibility of her undertaking by paying for the
harm done, but upon receiving full compensation for his loss excuses full
performance or its monetary equivalent. Rather than treating the prom-
44. See Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145,
1149-50 (1970) (specific relief is better suited to putting the promisee in the position he would
have been in had the promise been performed).
45. See supra note 32.
46. C. FRIED, supra note 32, at 16.
47. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 340, 358
(1983).
48. C. FRIED, supra note 32, at 20-21.
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isor as an infant, the promisee may be treating the promisor as he himself
would want to be treated if the tables were turned.
The rhetoric of promise-keeping and personal autonomy comes eas-
ily to those who seek to enforce the promises of others. Those with the
power to negotiate favorable contracts naturally support rules that en-
force those contracts to the fullest extent. But the importance of prom-
ise-keeping is not the only moral value involved in choosing a contract
damages measure. One could argue in moral terms that a person should
not insist on obtaining the full advantage resulting from another person's
miscalculation of current market conditions, for example. Promisees
seeking to enlist state power to effectuate promised advantages cannot
persuasively rest their claims on any natural or necessary affinity between
the expectation measure of contract damages and shared notions of
morality.
B. Expectation and Efficiency
(1) Focusing on the Breach-or-Perform Decision
In the last twenty years several scholars interested in the economic
analysis of law have turned their attention to the subject of remedies for
breach of contract.49 An early notion was that the remedy for breach of
contract should be chosen with an eye toward its effect on the decisions
of contracting parties about whether to perform or to breach. 50 Parties
should be encouraged to perform when breach would be inefficient, and
encouraged to default when breach would be efficient. Breach is efficient
when the defaulting party can pay the other party enough money to
make that other party indifferent to the breach, and the defaulting party
is still better off than if she had performed the contract and paid no dam-
ages. The expectation measure of damages was thought to provide the
precise incentive needed to make the "efficient breach" idea work. 5' If
49. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 43; Barton, The Econonic Basis of Damages for
Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972); Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage
Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970) [hereinafter Birming-
ham, Breach of Contract]; Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The
Geometry of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49; Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 7; Farber,
Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 303 (1983) [hereinafter Far-
ber, Contract Law]; Farber, Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damnagesfbr
Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443 (1980) [hereinafter Farber, Economic Efficiency]:
Goetz & Scott, supra note 10; Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract. 11 BEml. J.
ECON. 466 (1980).
50. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 43, § 4.8, at 106-09; Birmingham, Breach of Con-
tract, supra note 49, at 289.
51. See R. POSNER, supra note 43, § 4.8, at 107; Birmingham, Breach of Contract. supra
note 49, at 285, 292.
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the defaulting party pays expectation damages, she is, by definition, put-
ting the other party in the same position as performance would have
done, thus making that party indifferent to breach or performance.
Damages higher than expectation damages, or specific performance,
would deter efficient breaches; damages below the expectation level
would fail to deter inefficient breaches.
a. Pareto Efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency
One concept of efficiency used in this "efficient breach" argument is
called "Pareto efficiency" by economists.5 2 A. Mitchell Polinsky defines
"Pareto efficiency" as follows: "A situation is said to be Pareto efficient
or Pareto optimal if there is no change from that situation that can make
someone better off without making someone else worse off."' 53 As a theo-
retical matter, the Pareto-efficiency argument for expectation damages
seems airtight. The very definition of the expectation interest seems to be
simply an expression of the Pareto principle. The expectation measure is
defined as the equivalent of performance-as the amount of money nec-
essary to prevent the promisee from being made worse off by breach.
Payment of any lesser amount will leave the promisee worse off than if he
had received performance, and thus the breach and the accompanying
lesser payment cannot be a step toward Pareto optimality.
Even most proponents of the Pareto-efficiency idea would agree,
however, that Pareto efficiency is not an appropriate criterion for all
human behavior.54 Requiring that every action satisfy the Pareto crite-
rion would preclude a large portion of all human activity. Courts, for
example, could never award damages at all if they took only Pareto-effi-
cient steps, because any damage award makes the defendant worse off
than if the court had not made the award.5 5 Most commentators who
have used the concept of Pareto efficiency seem to have advanced a
smaller, and what seems to be a much less controversial, argument: if all
52. See V. PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 261 (A. Schwier trans. 1971).
53. A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 n.4 (1983).
54. "In practical situations, it is rarely the case that the social choice is between an alter-
native x and an alternative y such that everyone likes x at least as well as y. The Pareto
criterion can rarely be used." A. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE
THEORY 142 (1980). Since the Pareto test concentrates on the best one can do within the
limits of mutual benefit, it cannot consider the gains to society where one person gains more
than another party loses. M. DOBB, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL-
ISM 11 (1970).
55. The argument by those advocating the expectation measure of damages is not that
awarding expectation damages is a Pareto-efficient step, but rather that awarding expectation
damages after breach will create incentives for this defendant and others contemplating breach
on future occasions to make Pareto-efficient decisions.
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can agree that an action will hurt no one and benefit someone, why not
take that action, regardless of what your moral philosophy might be?
56
In the context of damages for breach of contract, this more limited
Pareto-efficiency argument cuts against specific performance or damages
higher than the expectation amount, because these remedies discourage
Pareto-efficient breach. Breach and payment of expectation damages is
Pareto efficient if the defaulting party is still better off after paying expec-
tation damages than she would have been had she performed.
The Pareto argument against damages less than expectation is not as
clear. It says that breach would not be a step toward Pareto optimality,
but it does not necessarily compel the conclusion that breach should not
occur.5 7 Breach and payment of less-than-expectation damages would
generally result in both benefit to the promisor and harm to the promisee.
The Pareto-efficiency argument, however, does not help us to measure
which is greater or even allow us to compare the two.
To compare one person's loss with another person's gain, econo-
mists can employ the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.5 8 Jules Cole-
man defines this concept as follows: "A redistribution of resources is
Kaldor-Hicks efficient if and only if under the redistribution the winners
win enough so that they could compensate the losers. The notion of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency does not require that the winners actually com-
pensate the losers."' 59 The Kaldor-Hicks argument works in theory
56. See, e.g., A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 53, at 7-8; R. POSNER, supra note 43, § 1.2, at
12, § 4.8, at 107; Birmingham, Breach of Contract, supra note 49, at 278-80 & n.20.
57. Breach and payment of less-than-expectation damages can never be a Pareto-efficient
step because by definition the promisee will be worse off than if the promisor had performed.
But a decision by the promisor to perform because expectation damages would exceed the
promisor's gain through breach is not Pareto efficient either, because the promisor will be
worse off than she was before performing. In other words, when the promisee's loss from
breach exceeds the promisor's gain from breach, either the promisor or the promisee will be
worse off after the breach-or-perform decision is made.
58. See, e.g., Kaldor, A Note on Tariffs and the Terms of Trade, 7 ECONOMICA 377
(1940); Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal Comparisons of Utility,
49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
59. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic
Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 239 (1980).
The Kaldor-Hicks concept was an answer to an obvious shortcoming of Pareto efficiency,
which is that "the set of alternative states likely to occur in the real world for which in fact
'everyone' in the one state will be better off than he is in an alternative or existing state cannot
be very large." Mishan, Welfare Criteria: Resolution of a Paradox, 83 ECON. J. 747, 766
(1973). Kaldor-Hicks analysis shifts the focus of the welfare criterion away from the individ-
ual and onto the community. Since in a Kaldor-Hicks-efficient move, the gains in welfare will
exceed the losses, there is the possibility that the winners could compensate the losers, and
everyone would be better off after the move, thereby achieving Pareto efficiency. Under the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion, however, there is no requirement that compensation actually take
place. See A. FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 143-44. Although a Kaldor-Hicks reallocation of
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against a damage measure less than the expectation level as well as
against one higher than expectation. Like the Pareto argument, the
Kaldor-Hicks argument is a simple one that starts from the premise that
expectation damages equal the loss to the promisee caused by breach. If
the promisor could breach and pay a lesser amount of damages, it is
possible for a breach to occur that would harm the promisee more than it
would benefit the promisor. On the other hand, a promisor induced by
the expectation measure to perform would never incur a loss that was
greater than the promisee's gain from performance; if the loss exceeded
the promisee's gain, the promisor would breach and come out ahead even
after paying expectation damages.
Several commentators recently have criticized these economic effi-
ciency arguments--even the seemingly noncontroversial Pareto argu-
ment against specific performance or higher-than-expectation damages. 60
The most common criticism is that when the efficient-breach idea moves
from theory to practice it loses its self-evident persuasiveness. For ex-
ample, Ian Macneil criticizes the methodology of the efficient-breach the-
orists: "There is a fundamental intellectual flaw in using a model based
on man-outside-society to analyze the behavior of man-in-society. ' 61 He
claims that the theory is indeterminate because it fails to take sufficient
account of the effects of transaction costs and externalities. 62 He argues
that the conclusion that expectation damages are preferable to specific
performance cannot be justified by theory alone. Although it might be
argued that Macneil's criticism is a fortiori an argument against an even
lesser remedy like reliance damages, his point is that the oversimplified
economic analysis itself is not persuasive. His criticism would apply to
the use of the analysis to support a choice of expectation over reliance as
well.
There is thus a serious question about the usefulness of economic
analysis based on unrealistic assumptions of perfect information, absence
resources will not necessarily be Pareto optimal or Pareto superior with regard to the original
distribution, it may be either or both. Coleman, supra, at 240.
60. See, e.g., Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the
Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 131 (1981); Macneil, Efficient Breach of Con-
tract. Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947, 951-52 (1982); Schwartz, The Case for Specific
Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 278-96 (1979). But see Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminu-
tion in Market Value: The Relevance of Subjective Value, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 381 (1983);
Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1377-
86 (1982).
61. Macneil, supra note 60, at 961 (footnote omitted).
62. Id. at 950-60. Coleman defines externalities as "inefficient external effects-social
costs or benefits that result in inefficient production or nonoptimal distributions of welfare."
Coleman, supra note 59, at 232 (footnote omitted).
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of transaction costs, and neutral effects on third parties. But even if the
economic efficiency arguments can tell us something useful about cause
and effect, it is important to recognize that the conclusions of these eco-
nomic-efficiency theorists depend upon the point of departure. Theorists
making the efficient-breach arguments have assumed that the starting
point from which to judge whether or not someone is made worse off is
the performance level promised but not yet secured. From this starting
point both the economic arguments and appeals to fairness work through
to an almost inevitable choice of expectation damages. The economic
arguments do not help us to make the choice of starting points; by defin-
ing anything less than full performance as "loss," these arguments have
assumed away our most difficult, and fundamental, question.
If the focus is shifted from the time of contemplation of breach to
the time of contemplation of contract formation, then "loss" occurs if the
promisee is worse off than he was at that earlier time. One may enter
into a contract and then break it as long as no one else (specifically the
other contracting party) is made worse off by those actions. If the start-
ing point is the status of the promisee before the promise was made, then
by definition the reliance measure is the one suggested by the notion of
economic efficiency.
In sum, the fact that economic efficiency analysis leads to different
conclusions depending upon the starting point of the analysis provides
one illustration of the general point that it is not appropriate to judge
remedies for breach of contract solely on the basis of their effect on the
breach-or-perform decision.
b. Sales to Lower-Value Users
Before turning to other factors influencing the choice of remedies for
breach of contract, let us examine another economic argument for expec-
tation damages that focuses exclusively on the breach-or-perform deci-
sion-the argument that any remedy less than full expectation damages
may result in breaches by sales to lower-value users.63 Such breaches
would be inefficient, according to this argument, because if the subject of
a contract ends up in the hands of someone who values the item less
than does the original buyer under the contract, society is worse off than
if the contract had been performed and the item delivered to the original
buyer.
A. Mitchell Polinsky gives the following hypothetical example to
illustrate the point:
63. See A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 53, at 29-32.
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S is the seller of a widget with production costs of $150
B1 is a buyer who values the widget at $200
B1 incurs reliance expenditures of $10
B1 pays S the contract price of $160 in advance
B2 is a buyer who values the widget at $18064
Polinsky argues that under these facts (and other necessary assump-
tions) 65 an inefficient breach may result under a reliance measure of dam-
ages. 6 6 S can breach, pay reliance damages to BI of $170 ($160 paid in
advance plus $10 reliance expenditure), and sell to B2, who would pay up
to $180 for the widget. Since B2 values the widget at $180 and BI at
$200, the widget will wind up in the hands of a lower-value user.67
A sale to a lower-value user is inefficient because under economic
theory the value a person places on an item determines the benefit that
accrues to him when he receives it. If B1 values the widget at $200 and if
B2 values the widget at $180, it is in the interests of both B1 and B2 that
B1 wind up with the widget. A sale of the widget from B2 to B1 for $180
makes B1 better off without making B2 any worse off. A sale of the
widget from B2 to BI for $200 makes B2 better off without making B1
any worse off. Thus a sale from B2 to B1 (that is, from the lower-value
to the higher-value user) at any price between $180 and $200 is a Pareto-
efficient step.
How often is an inefficient result likely to occur under the reliance
measure? The sale to B2 will not take place unless B2 offers to pay more
money to S than S received under the contract with B1. The sale to B2
will not be inefficient unless B2 places a lower value on the widget than
does B1. So B2 must make a higher offer than B1 did on an item that he
values less than B] does. This is the starting point, and already it seems
that the cases that present the problem would be exceptional ones.
68
64. Id. at 26-32.
65. Polinsky's assumptions include the following: The parties are risk-neutral. Id. at 27.
There is no replacement market for widgets. Id. at 26. There is no bidding for widgets by B1
and B2, and no renegotiation of contract terms by BI and S. Id. at 29.
66. Id. at 32.
67. Id.
68. When BI 's reliance expenditures are added to the return of the contract price already
paid (that is, when reliance expenditure damages are added to the bare restitution measure) the
possibilities of a sale to a lower-value user are further reduced. Again, the breach by sale to B2
is inefficient only if BI 's value (BIV) is greater than B2's value (B2V). The breach will not
occur under a reliance expenditure measure of damages unless B2V is greater than the sum of
the original price (BIK) and B1 's reliance expenditures (BIRE). The conditions for inefficient
breach under a reliance expenditure measure would be: BIV > B2V and B2V < BIK +
BIRE.
In words, the range of possible offers by B2 that would result in an inefficient breach falls
between Bl's value at the upper end and the combination of Bl's contract price and Bl's
reliance expenditures at the lower end. This range will be nonexistent unless the gap between
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If B1 contracted to pay so much less for the widget than it is worth
to him (so that even if he receives a full return of the contract price and
full compensation for reliance expenditures and lost opportunity he will
still be worse off than if the contract had been performed), you might
expect B] to renegotiate with S and offer to pay more for the widget to
prevent S from selling to B2. B1 should win any bidding war with B2
because B1 places a higher value on the widget than does B2. We thus
come to one of the assumptions necessary to reach the conclusion that
the reliance measure will lead to widgets winding up in the hands of
lower-value users. Polinsky assumes that renegotiation by B1 with S or
repurchase by B1 from B2 will not be worthwhile because of bargaining
costs, noting in this connection that absent bargaining costs the Coase
Theorem tells us that any remedy would be equally efficient.
69
Another important assumption necessary to Polinsky's lower-value
user illustration is that there is no readily available market in which to
purchase replacement widgets. 70 As indicated in section I of this arti-
cle,71 in a perfectly competitive market, the lost-opportunity reliance
measure of damages will be the same as the expectation measure.
Neither measure will lead to breaches by sales to lower-value users.
If we depart from the fictional world of perfect competition and if
we assume that widgets are generally available in markets in the less-
than-perfect real world, even the expectation measure of damages may
not prevent all sales to lower-value users. In Polinsky's example, the'
expectation recovery had to equal the full value that B1 placed on the
widget ($200). Since B1 could not obtain a widget elsewhere, only the
full $200 would place him in the same position that he would have been
in had S performed the contract as promised. But assume that there is a
the value that B1 places on the widget and the contract price that B1 negotiated with S ex-
ceeds B1 's reliance expenditures.
What happens when we add lost opportunity to the concept of reliance? Polinsky as-
sumes that ifB1 had not entered into the contract for the widget with S, B1 would have earned
zero profit (in other words B1 did not forgo any opportunities to contract with S). He then
asserts in a footnote: "This assumption is not essential and does not affect any of the general
conclusions about the reliance remedy." Id. at 30 n.20. Polinsky may be right in the sense that
the addition of the concept of lost opportunity does not disturb his general conclusion that the
reliance measure theoretically can result in sales to lower-value users. But to the extent that
lost opportunities are included in the calculation of reliance damages, the chances for sales to
lower-value users under a reliance measure are reduced even further.
69. Id. at 29. The Coase Theorem was introduced in Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For an explanation of the Coase Theorem, see A.M. POLINSKY,
supra note 53, at 11-14.
70. A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 53, at 26.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18; see also Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 7,
at 1444-59; Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 746-47; Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1284.
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market for widgets. Further assume that the market price of widgets at
the time of S's breach was $160, that B2 subjectively values the widget at
$180, and that B2 offers to buy from S at $165. Under these assump-
tions, BJ 's expectation damages will be reduced from $200 to $160 (plus
the additional cost of making the substitute purchase) because B1 could
wind up in the same position as if S performed by purchasing another
widget for $160.72 It will be profitable for S to breach because B2's offer
of $165 exceeds the expectation damages of $160.
Of course, there is an apparent problem with this example: why
would B2 offer $165 for a widget that is obtainable on the market for
$160? But if contract offers always equaled market price then expecta-
tion and lost-opportunity reliance would always be equal. Expectation
damages will exceed lost-opportunity reliance damages only if the de-
faulting party offered a better deal to the nondefaulting party than was
available from any other source. If we are willing to accept the possibil-
ity of a seller's offer deviating from the market price, then we should also
accept the possibility of a buyer's offer deviating from the market price.
The observations in this subsection so far serve to minimize the im-
portance of the argument that expectation damages are efficient because
they prevent breaches by sales to lower-value users, but they do not re-
fute that argument. I have argued that under a lost-opportunity reliance
damages measure these inefficient breaches are likely to be quite rare,
difficult to detect, and more theoretical than real. An advocate of the
expectation measure might well respond that even if these inefficient
breaches are rare, we should not tolerate them when they can be avoided
by choosing the expectation measure. I have pointed out that the argu-
ment that reliance damages may result in items winding up in the hands
of lower-value users depends upon the assumption that there will be no
renegotiation between the contracting parties and no buy-backs by the
nondefaulting party from a third party. The response to this point is that
negotiations cost money, and these unnecessary transaction costs could
be avoided by adherence to the expectation measure. However, as I have
shown, under certain conditions breaches by sales to lower-value users
are possible even under an expectation measure. One might respond to
this final point by arguing that the question is not whether expectation
damages will lead to any inefficient breaches, but rather whether they
72. The existence of a replacement market for widgets allows the court to protect BlJs
expectation by awarding him the "objective" (market) value of the widgets ($160) instead of
using Bl's subjective value ($200) as the measure of lost expectation. Since we assume these
are fungible widgets, a replacement widget should have the same subjective value to B1 as the
widget for which he originally contracted.
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will lead to fewer inefficient breaches than would occur under a reliance
measure.
These arguments and counterarguments conceal the major point,
which is that the strength of the economic efficiency argument for expec-
tation damages depends upon the question that is being asked. If we as-
sume that we find ourselves at a point in time when a contracting party is
deciding whether or not to perform her contract, 73 and if we further as-
sume that we want to create the optimal incentive for that party to make
her decision whether or not to perform on the basis of what would be the
optimal result for the two contracting parties considered together, exclu-
sive of the effects on third parties, 74 and if we accept the general method-
ology of economic arguments including their implicit assumptions about
how people react to economic incentives, then the expectation measure
is not only the best choice of incentive, it is the definition of the optimal
incentive.
But the reliance measure that gives full effect to the concept of lost
opportunity is inferior to the expectation measure only if we make all
these assumptions. If we change or broaden the inquiry, the expectation
measure may no longer define the optimal result. The possible effects of
a particular remedy other than its effects on the breach-or-perform deci-
sion must be examined before reaching any ultimate conclusion about the
most efficient remedy for a breach of contract.
(2) Other Effects Influencing the Selection of a Remedy for
Breach of Contract
Economic arguments generally assume that people will adjust their
behavior in response to changes in economic incentives. For example,
the economic arguments discussed so far assume that people will respond
to differing measures of damages by altering their breach-or-perform de-
cisions in the future. One possible response to these arguments is to be
skeptical about the efficacy of incentive creation; one might doubt
whether what judges decide in litigated cases about the proper measure
73. Ian Macneil points out that the "efficient breach" concept is based not on the decision
to breach, but rather on the decision to perform. The objective is to perform the most econom-
ically efficient contract. If that decision requires the nonperformance of a less advantageous
contract, there are several ways to achieve that end, breach being but one. The parties to the
less advantageous contract may renegotiate, or the original supplier may secure the desired
performance from some other supplier. There are options available which fall short of outright
breach of the less advantageous contract. See Macneil, supra note 60, at 950-51.
74. According to Macneil, failure to consider all the costs associated with breach (e.g.,
litigation, harm to reputation, etc.) increases the likelihood of inefficient breaches. See id. at
960. Since we hope to maximize efficiency at the systemic level, the traditional focus of "effi-
cient breach" at the contracting parties' level seems misplaced.
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of damages for breach of contract will have a significant effect on the
behavior of future contracting parties. The skeptic might be more con-
cerned about reaching a proper result in the case to be decided than
about attempting to affect future behavior.
Another possible response to the breach-or-perform economic argu-
ments is to argue that the choice of remedy for breach of contract may
influence behavior in matters other than the decision whether to breach
or perform the contract. Some of these possible effects will be discussed
briefly in this section, although no attempt will be made to be complete
either in the identification of behavior that might be affected or in the
exploration of what the effects on that behavior might be. The general
point is that any efficiency analysis that suggests a particular remedy has
many effects to consider beyond the decision to breach or to perform.
a. Effect on the Level of Future Contracting Activity
An important consideration-perhaps the most important one-in
choosing a remedy for breach of contract is the effect that choice will
have on the readiness of people to form contracts in the future. Some
who argue for the expectation measure attempt to forge a link between
the breach-or-perform decision and the incentives for future contracting
activity. 75 Daniel Farber sets out this argument, which he says follows
from the "neoclassical model" of contract (a model that he criticizes be-
cause it is based on unrealistic assumptions of perfect information and
absence of transaction costs): 7 6 Whenever the amount of damages for
breach is less than the cost of performance, an incentive exists for a party
to breach. Obviously, if people do not perform their contracts, people
will-no longer enter into contracts. But even if most people do perform
their contracts, the existence of any breach activity remedied by damages
less than the value of full performance will make the nondefaulting party
unwilling to pay the same amount as he would if performance were as-
sured. If the price goes down, the "honest" people who were performing
all the time will no longer be able to afford to perform at the same level.
The effect is a downward spiral of price and performance until the mar-
ket collapses and no contracts are formed.
77
If this argument is correct, it is difficult to understand how the insti-
tution of contract has survived. Even with the expectation measure as
75. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 49, at 278-79.
76. Farber, Contract Law, supra note 49, at 310-18, 324.
77. Id. at 321. Farber points out that this is an illustration of the "lemons" problem. Id.
at 321 & n.84, 326-27 & n.l 13 (citing Ackerlof, The Market for "Lemons" Quality, Uncer-
tainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970)).
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the predominant standard for contract damages, we have not been able to
eliminate all inefficient breaches or to guarantee that a party victimized
by breach will always be as well off as if there had been full performance.
Yet markets do not crumble. People still enter into contracts. Intui-
tively, it does not seem that a reliance measure of damages would prevent
people from entering into contracts. Will not people continue to contract
if they think that they may benefit from the performance of the contract
and that if something goes wrong at least they will be restored to the
position that they would have been in had they not contracted?
Charles Goetz and Robert Scott focus on the optimal level of prom-
issory activity in constructing their economic argument for what
amounts to the lost-opportunity reliance measure of damages.78 They at-
tempt to demonstrate that, if the goal of a damages remedy is to create
the optimal incentive for people to make efficient decisions about whether
or not to make promises, traditional economic analysis supports choos-
ing the reliance measure.
b. Effect on the Allocation of Risk
Polinsky has argued that another effect of the choice of a remedy for
breach of contract that should be considered is the impact of the remedy
on the allocation of risk between the contracting parties.79 If one party is
more risk averse than the other, it is in both parties' interests for the risk
averse party to pay the other party to bear the risks associated with the
contract. A remedy that encourages this risk allocation is efficient to that
extent.
To illustrate his argument, Polinsky uses a hypothetical sale of
goods situation in which the risk to be allocated is the (beneficial) risk
that another buyer will offer to purchase the subject matter of the con-
tract for more than the agreed contract price set by the seller and the
original buyer. Polinsky concludes that under these circumstances (with
some additional assumptions) the expectation measure of damages is
more efficient than either the reliance or the restitution measures. 80 If
the buyer is risk averse and the seller is risk neutral, the expectation mea-
sure is the efficient remedy because it leaves the buyer in the same posi-
tion whether or not the second buyer makes is offer. If the buyer is risk
neutral and the seller is risk averse, the efficient measure is the amount of
the second buyer's offer, because that measure leaves the seller in the
78. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1281-86.
79. A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 53, at 57-63; Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through Breach of
Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1983).
80. Polinsky, supra note 79, at 433-36.
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same position whether or not the offer is made. If both parties are risk
averse, the proper measure of damages lies somewhere between the ex-
pectation measure and the higher level of damages measured by the offer
of the second buyer. According to this argument, since the expectation
measure is just right if the buyer is risk averse and the seller is risk neu-
tral, and too small if the seller is risk averse, a reliance measure that is
less than the expectation measure is never efficient with respect to risk
allocation. 81
Although Polinsky's analysis seems sound under his assumptions
and as applied to his hypotheticals, it is not a persuasive argument for a
general choice of the expectation measure over the reliance measure.
First, as Polinsky recognizes, when the risk to be allocated is a risk of
loss rather than a risk of gain, the reliance measure may be more efficient
than the expectation remedy would be, if the breaching party is risk
averse and the nonbreaching party is risk neutral.82 For example, as-
sume that the risk to be allocated is that the seller's production costs will
be greater than expected. Further assume that those abnormal produc-
tion costs will exceed the value the buyer places on the goods to be sold.
Efficiency dictates breach by the seller. The optimal damages payment,
to place the risk of higher production costs on the nonbreaching party,
will be the seller's normal production costs, because in that event the
seller is put in the same position whether the production costs are above
normal or not.83 The reliance measure of damages, although probably
too large,84 will be closer to optimum than would the expectation mea-
sure, which normally will be larger than the reliance measure (because if
the value the buyer placed on the good to be sold did not exceed the
seller's normal production costs, the buyer would not have contracted to
buy).
The second reason that Polinsky's risk-allocation analysis does not
necessarily support a general preference for expectation damages over
reliance damages is that it may be difficult to determine who is or is not
risk averse if the parties do not specify any remedy in the contract. The
risk-allocation argument provides greater support for enforcing liqui-
dated damages clauses than it does for awarding expectation damages.85
81. Id. at 435-36.
82. Id. at 442-43.
83. Id.
84. Reliance damages would equal the return of the contract price plus the buyer's reli-
ance expenditures, a figure that we can assume will exceed the seller's normal production costs,
because otherwise the seller would not have contracted to sell.
85. If the parties to a contract were concerned solely with the allocation of risk, then they
would choose a damage payment that allocates risk according to their relative aversion to risk.
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c. Effect on the Level of Reliance Investment
Another criterion that Polinsky uses to evaluate contract remedies is
their effect on the level of reliance investment by the contracting par-
ties.86 If we assume that reliance expenditures are totally wasted if the
contract is not actually performed, 87 then we can create an incentive for
the optimal level of reliance expenditure by placing the risk of nonper-
formance on the party making the reliance investment decision. If a con-
tracting party is aware that he will be denied compensation for reliance
expenditures if the other party fails to perform, he will appropriately cal-
culate the chances of nonperformance and include that calculation in his
decision whether or not to invest in reliance activity.
88
Polinsky concludes that under the optimal-reliance-investment crite-
rion both the expectation and reliance measures are inefficient because
they both protect contracting parties from loss due to imprudent reliance
investments.8 9 According to Polinsky, the expectation measure protects
the reliance investor by, in effect, guaranteeing performance, 90 so that the
reliance investor is guaranteed to receive the increased value of contract
performance generated by his reliance investment whether or not the
contract is actually performed. The reliance measure protects the reli-
ance investor by directly reimbursing the reliance costs if the contract is
not performed. Damage measures that do not increase as the level of
reliance investment increases, such as the restitution measure or a no-
damages rule, would be efficient under this analysis. 91
d. Other Possible Effects
Polinsky's reliance-investment-decision argument and his breach-or-
perform-decision argument can point in different directions.92 In order
to choose an appropriate remedy one may have to decide which criterion
is more important in the particular fact situation. Yet still other effects
Therefore, a liquidated damages remedy would, by definition, allocate the risk in the most
efficient way. A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 53, at 62-63.
86. Id. at 32-35.
87. Id. at 32; Polinsky, supra note 79, at 435.
88. A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 53, at 33; Polinsky, supra note 79, at 435-36.
89. A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 53, at 33-35.
90. Id. at 33.
91. Id. at 34-35 & n.22. Cooter and Eisenberg argue that the problem of "overreliance"
often is not important and that if recovery is limited to reasonable reliance, both expectation
and reliance measures would lead to efficient levels of reliance. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note
7, at 1465-68.
92. Polinsky claims that his breach-or-perform analysis supports an expectation measure
and that his optimal-reliance analysis supports a restitution measure. A.M. POLINSKY, supra
note 53, at 36.
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must be considered. If we are concerned about expenditures made on the
assumption that the contract will be performed (what we have been call-
ing "reliance investment"), we should also be concerned about expendi-
tures made to protect oneself in case the contract is not performed (what
some have called "precautionary" investment).93 Promoting the optimal
level of precautionary investment is another criterion by which to judge
a remedy for breach of contract. The same might be said about "reassur-
ance" activity-actions taken by promisors to convince their contracting
partners that they will honor their performance obligations.
94
In addition, the choice of damage remedies might have effects on the
amount of resources expended to negotiate remedial terms, on litigation
costs, on distribution of wealth, on the costs and benefits to third parties,
on respect for the institution of contract or for the legal system, and so
on.95 When we choose to go beyond making our best assessment of the
proper corrective action in the individual case in order to create incen-
tives for future behavior, we enter a complicated and uncertain world.
(3) Concluding Observations on Efficiency Arguments
Existing economic arguments do not demonstrate the superiority of
the expectation measure of contract damages. Even if we put aside argu-
ments rejecting the whole idea of economic analysis either because its
unrealistic assumptions make it useless or because its political and philo-
sophical biases make it pernicious, we still must face the fact that the
effects of a choice of remedy are many and complex. Current economic
theory simply cannot provide conclusions about the choice of remedy in
light of all the possible effects. Perhaps more importantly, even sophisti-
cated economic analysis does not always tell us how to frame our ques-
tions. The concept of Pareto efficiency, for example, fails to address the
crucial question of how we should define "loss."' 96 In short, economic
analysis does not provide a convincing answer to Fuller and Perdue's
question: Why protect the expectation interest?
III. Choosing Between Expectation and Reliance Damages
When Reliance Loss Exceeds Lost Expectation
Before considering the practical problems involved in implementing
93. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1274. Cooter and Eisenberg talk about "precau-
tion" by the promisor to avoid the promisor's own breach. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 7,
at 1464.
94. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 1274.
95. See the list of possible effects in Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1462.
96. See supra subsection II.B(1)(a).
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a reliance measure that takes account of lost opportunities, we should
pause to examine a situation that might cast some doubt on the choice of
reliance protection as the theoretical goal of a breach of contract remedy.
The discussion so far has assumed that the choice is between the expecta-
tion measure of damages and a lesser reliance measure. It is possible,
however, for reliance loss to exceed expectation loss. This section will
consider, first, whether the expectation loss should act as an upper limit
on reliance damages, and then, second, whether an affirmative answer
would betray an inconsistency in the analysis.
A. Choosing Between Expectation and Reliance When Reliance is Greater
In most cases of contract formation and breach, an expectation
award will be equal to or greater than a reliance award, even if the reli-
ance measure gives full effect to the concept of lost opportunity. This
observation should not be surprising, since we would expect that the vic-
tim of the breach chose to enter into the contract because he preferred
what his position would be after performance to his position before con-
tracting. Thus, before attempting to choose between expectation and a
greater reliance remedy, we first should try to identify when we will be
faced with this unusual choice.
Reliance loss will exceed expectation loss whenever full performance
of the contract would have left the plaintiff in a worse position than he
would have occupied had he not entered into the contract with the de-
fendant in the first place. The contract need not be a "losing contract" in
the sense that full performance would have made the plaintiff worse off
than if he had not contracted with anybody at all.97 Since reliance loss
includes lost opportunity, reliance damages exceed expectation damages
whenever full performance of the actual contract would have been less
advantageous to the plaintiff than full performance of a contract the
plaintiff would have entered into (if any) had he not contracted with the
defendant. The plaintiff may have lost such superior opportunity either
at the time of formation of the contract or at some time after formation. 98
97. When commentators use the term "losing contract," they usually mean that perform-
ance of the contract would have made the plaintiff suffer a net out-of-pocket loss. See, e.g., J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 533 (2d ed. 1977); D. DOBBs, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 867-77 (1973); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 77-79.
98. Richard Bronaugh has set forth a series of situations in which lost opportunity ex-
ceeds lost expectation to illustrate his argument that lost opportunity should not be a compen-
sable item of contract damages. See Bronaugh, Lost Opportunities in Contract Damages, 17
VAL. U.L. REV. 735 (1983). Since Bronaugh assumes throughout his article that at least ex-
pectation damages will be awarded, he does not address the choice between the expectation
measure and a lesser lost-opportunity reliance measure. Thus, his analysis is directly relevant
only to section III of this Article.
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(1) Opportunities Lost at the Time of Formation
Under what circumstances would the plaintiff forgo an opportunity
that was better for him than the contract he entered into? One possibility
is that he was unaware of the better opportunity. If that is the situation,
the case for a damages recovery based on loss of that opportunity seems
quite weak. If the plaintiff was not aware of the opportunity when he
contracted with the defendant, it is hard to see how the loss of that op-
portunity can be attributed to the defendant's offer. 99 The plaintiff would
not have had the benefit of this opportunity even if there had been no
contract with the defendant, unless contracting with the defendant pre-
vented the plaintiff from discovering that opportunity.
A more compelling example of a forgone superior opportunity is
when the plaintiff knowingly chooses the defendant's offer even though
its terms are not as favorable as those of another offer because of the
belief (mistaken as it turns out) that the defendant is more reliable and
more likely to keep her promise. Assume the following facts: A is con-
sidering an offer from Company X to sell to A a quantity of heating oil
with delivery to begin in six weeks. A saleswoman for Company Y
comes along and tells A that Company X is a relatively new and untested
company, but that Company Y has a long history and a good name (as-
sume that the quality of the heating oil is the same). She looks at X's
offer and asks A if he is willing to pay a little more for the assurance that
delivery will be made as promised. A contracts with Y at a higher price
than X's offer because of the concerns raised by Y's saleswoman. When
delivery time arrives, Y fails to deliver to A as promised, and X meets all
its delivery commitments. The market price for heating oil at the time A
learns of the breach exceeds both the contract price with Y and the price
that had been offered by X.
The expectation measure of damages in this situation would be the
difference between-the contract price and the market price. 100 If a judge
were to find as a matter of fact that if A had not contracted with Y he
would have contracted with X, should he or she measure A's damages by
the difference between the price that X offered and the market price?
Fuller and Perdue would not think so, because awarding full reliance
damages to A would put him in a better position than he would have
99. See id. at 739-40. If the plaintiff was truly unaware of the opportunity and never
would have discovered it even if he had not contracted with the defendant, then it seems to be
stretching the words to say that he has "forgone" an opportunity, or even that he has "lost" an
opportunity.
100. See U.C.C. § 2-713 (1978). For an excellent discussion of the relationship of standard
damage formulas to expectation theory, see Cooter &,Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1438-44.
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occupied had the contract with Y been fully performed.101 This result
would be wrong, they would say, because permitting a recovery in excess
of the expectation measure would allow A to shift to Y the loss attributa-
ble to A 's choice of Y over X, 102 a move that is unjustifiable since A freely
chose to contract with Y. Although Fuller and Perdue's argument is a
strong one that has received general acceptance,10 3 the circumstances of
this particular hypothetical create an attractive case, in my view, for re-
quiring Y to make A as well off as he would have been had Y's saleswo-
man never approached him. Some may remain unconvinced that an
award in excess of expectation is justified even when the promisor di-
rectly induces the promisee to forgo a more favorable opportunity. But if
the greater reliance award is considered appropriate here, which facts are
necessary to that conclusion? What if it was not Y's saleswoman who
convinced A to accept the more expensive offer? What if Y's saleswoman
made no explicit mention of her company's reliability for timely delivery?
What if Y's saleswoman was not aware of the terms of X's offer? These
questions may be difficult to answer, but the point is that it is not always
an obvious truth that an expectation award is more appropriate than a
greater reliance award calculated on the basis of an opportunity that the
plaintiff knowingly gave up in entering into a contract with the
defendant.
One reason that the heating oil hypothetical presents a somewhat
appealing case for the lost-opportunity reliance measure is that the de-
fendant convinced the plaintiff to make a choice that (except for the per-
ceived reliability factor) was less advantageous for the plaintiff at the
time the choice was made. The attractiveness of the lost-opportunity
measure is reduced if we view the situation as simply involving a bad
101. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 79 ("We will not in a suit for reimbursement for
losses incurred in reliance on a contract knowingly put the plaintiff in a better position than he
would have occupied had the contract been fully performed.") (emphasis in original); see also
Manganaro Bros. v. Gevyn Constr. Corp., 610 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1979) (construction contract);
United States v. Mountain States Constr. Co., 588 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) (construction
contract); L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949) (manufac-
turing contract); Kizas v. Webster, 532 F. Supp. 1331 (D.D.C. 1982) (employment contract),
rev'don, other grounds, 707 F.2d 24 (D.C.. Cir. 1983); Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173,
399 A.2d 1374 (1979) (franchise agreement).
Bronaugh argues that requiring the defendant to pay reliance damages in excess of expec-
tancy would force him to "pay more than the value of his promise." Bronaugh, supra note 98,
at 741. It is not clear exactly what Bronaugh means by this statement. Would he also argue
against awarding reasonably foreseeable consequential damages exceeding the value of the de-
fendant's performance? Would these damages be more acceptable if we called them tort dam-
ages? See generally Birmingham, Notes on the Reliance Interest, 60 WASH. L. REv. 217 (1985).
102. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 78.
103. See, e.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 97, at 877.
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guess about future circumstances. To illustrate, assume that P sporting
goods company is looking for a tennis player to endorse its newly devel-
oped tennis racket. P speaks with agents for D and Q, two rising stars in
the professional tennis cosmos. After extensive market research, P deter-
mines that the selling power of the two players, at the present time, is
about equal. Player D offers her endorsement for $25,000; Player Q
wants $30,000. P thus contracts with D. D has a successful season, and
the value of her endorsement goes up to $40,000. Q has an equally suc-
cessful season, but also stars in a popular new movie. The value of her
endorsement skyrockets to, $100,000. D breaks her agreement with P by
endorsing the racket of another company for $40,000. The traditional
expectation measure would result in a judgment for P against D in the
amount of $15,000 (contract price/market price difference). The lost-op-
portunity reliance measure would yield a judgment of $70,000 (forgone
price/market price difference). 1°4
In this situation, the $15,000 expectation award seems to be the more
appropriate choice. By choosing to deal with D, P in a sense tied its
interests with hers; a deal was formed under which P shared in D's suc-
cess or failure on the tennis courts. Since D was not responsible for the
change in circumstances that made the value to P of a contract with Q
exceed that of a contract with D, even D's willful breach does not seem
to justify imposing the burden of this change on her.
(2) Opportunities Lost Subsequent to Contract Formation
Sometimes opportunities may be lost after the contract with the de-
fendant has been formed but before breach occurs. Consider the follow-
ing illustration: P contracts with D to buy 1000 pints of strawberries for
a total price of $1000, payable on delivery in eight weeks. One week later
Z offers to sell to P 1000 pints of strawberries of equal quality for $800,
payable on the same delivery date as set forth in P's contract with D. P
needs only 1000 pints. P calls D and asks if D still intends to deliver the
strawberries as promised. D responds that she will definitely do so. P
informs D of Z's offer, and asks D if she would reduce the price to $800
or let P out of the contract. D refuses both requests. The market price
for strawberries then rises rapidly and on the delivery date is $1200. D
sells the strawberries promised to P to someone else for $1200. P sues D
for breach. Should damages be assessed in the expectation amount of
$200 or in the lost-opportunity reliance amount of $400?
104. This problem might raise questions of foreseeability. It could be argued here that the
larger reliance award was not reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. See infra note 116.
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Proponents of the expectation measure would argue that a $200
damages award should be sufficient to discourage D from breach. They
would ask for a justification for placing P in a better position than he
would have occupied had D performed. They would point out that for P
to have taken advantage of the opportunity offered by Z, P himself
would have had to break his contract with D.10 5 Nevertheless, when one
party's fidelity to a contract causes him to forgo an opportunity that
would have placed him in a better position than the one the defendant
left him in, there seems to be some justice in requiring the defendant to
make up that difference.
Like the heating oil hypothetical illustrating lost opportunity at the
time of contract formation, 0 6 this hypothetical creates some sympathy
for the lost-opportunity measure of damages. These hypotheticals sug-
gest that sometimes plausible arguments can be made for the reliance
measure even when the effect would be to place the plaintiff in a better
position than that which performance would have placed him in. If these
arguments are found to be persuasive, expectation cannot be viewed as
the absolute limit of reliance damages. 1
07
105. Bronaugh, supra note 98, at 741. In Bronaugh's words, the plaintiff in this situation
is not losing an opportunity, but rather "eschew[ing] opportunism." Id.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
107. In a recent article, Henry Mather argues against awarding restitution damages in
excess of expectation damages in cases of partial performance by a seller followed by the
buyer's breach. Mather, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract: The Case of the
Partially Performing Seller, 92 YALE L.J. 14 (1982). Although Mather's discussion concerns
the choice between expectation damages and a higher amount of restitution damages, much of
it is relevant to the choice between expectation damages and a higher amount of reliance dam-
ages.
Mather begins by arguing that economic analysis is not helpful in making the choice
between restitution and expectation because transaction costs, particularly uncompensated
costs of litigation and other breach-related costs, render that analysis indeterminate. Id. at 21-
28. Mather turns to what he calls "liberal principles" for guidance. He identifies three "prin-
ciples" that he finds helpful: Minimal Coercion, Causal Responsibility, and Consent. Id. at
29-34. Applying these principles to the choice between restitution and expectation recoveries
for the partially performing seller (who, by assumption, cannot be given back his partial per-
formance in specie), Mather concludes that expectation is the proper choice. Id. at 36. Since
the buyer did not consent to pay anything in particular for partial performance, an interference
with buyer's liberty is required to protect the nondefaulting seller's higher-priority liberty.
That interference should be minimal-just enough to compensate the seller for losses caused
by the buyer's breach. The restitution measure would put the seller in a better position than if
there had been no breach, and thus would exceed damages caused by the breach. This argu-
ment would seem to apply with equal force to all reliance recoveries in excess of expectation;
thus Mather presumably would object to any reliance recovery that exceeds the expectation
level of damages.
Mather's argument for limiting recovery to the expectation measure is not convincing.
First of all, after he concludes that the undercompensation problem is so serious that it makes
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B. The Choice When Reliance Exceeds Expectation: A Different Rule for a
Special Case?
The previous subsection presented a couple of appealing cases for
choosing a lost-opportunity reliance measure over a smaller expectation
measure. Even in these situations, however, there are strong counter-
arguments for limiting damages to the expectation level. Admittedly, in
many if not most cases in which reliance exceeds expectation, the lesser
expectation amount seems preferable. The question then arises whether
it is consistent to argue that the goal of contract remedies should be to
protect against loss rather than to ensure expectation, and yet to use the
expectation measure as a ceiling on recovery.
One attempt to avoid the charge of inconsistency might be to argue
that "true" reliance damages for breach cannot exceed expectation dam-
ages. The argument would be that a damage award above the expecta-
tion amount cannot be justified as compensation for loss resulting from
the defendant's breach. The expectation theory says that if there had
been no breach, the plaintiff would have been in, say, position X. Award-
ing damages that- would put the plaintiff in a better position than X,
therefore, by definition cannot be compensation for loss caused by
breach.
Of course, as indicated in section 1,108 this position is an argument
against reliance recovery in general, not just reliance recoveries in excess
of the expectation amount. Although some reliance losses are attributa-
all economic analysis inconclusive and unhelpful, he fails to mention that problem again in his
discussion of "liberal principles."
Mather's applications of his principle of Consent raise doubts about whether he is actually
talking about consent as a matter of fact. He apparently assumes that in all cases: 1) the buyer
does not consent to pay the contract rate or any other particular price for partial performance
even when the reason for the seller's incomplete performance is the buyer's breach, id. at 34;
2) the buyer does consent to return any partial performance that can be returned in specie
upon the buyer's breach, id. at 37; and 3) the seller agrees to return all money paid by the
buyer under the contract upon the seller's breach, id. at 36-37. The cumulative effect of these
seemingly conclusive presumptions about consent is that both a plaintiff-buyer and a plaintiff-
seller whose part performance can be returned in specie can always choose either restitution or
expectation, whichever is greater. The plaintiff-seller whose part performance cannot be re-
turned in specie, however, is limited to an expectation recovery. These differing resolutions of
situations involving breach after part performance seem questionable as a matter of public
policy, and it strains credulity to justify them on the grounds that they simply reflect what
contracting parties invariably intend as a matter of fact.
For other criticisms of Mather's article, see Gegan, In Defense of Restitution: A Comment
on Mather, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract: The Case of the Partially Per-
forming Seller, 57 S. CA. L. REV. 723 (1984).
For an earlier treatment of restitution claims in excess of expectation loss, see Palmer, The
Contract Price as a Limit on Restitution for Defendant's Breach, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 264 (1959).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
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ble to the breach of a contract and not simply to its existence, most reli-
ance losses would have occurred even if the contract had been
performed, and in that sense were not caused by the breach. 109 It thus
seems that one must decide whether the fact that reliance losses would
have occurred even without a breach is a compelling argument against
awarding reliance damages for breach of contract. If the answer is yes,
then reliance loss compensation should not be the goal of contract reme-
dies whether or not reliance exceeds expectation. If the answer is no,
then the causation argument cannot be used to attack the propriety of
awarding reliance damages in excess of expectation loss. Other argu-
ments must justify the conclusion that reliance is the interest that should
be protected unless reliance loss exceeds expectation loss.
Consider the following simple cases:
Case I. Buyer and Seller enter into a contract for the sale of ten
widgets for a total price of $50, delivery to be made two months later.
The market price for these widgets at the time of the formation of the
contract is $55. Seller fails to deliver, and Buyer covers promptly at the
reasonable market price of $70.
Case II. All the facts are the same as in Case I except that the
market price for the widgets at the time of contract formation is $45
instead of $55.
Placing the facts of the two simplified cases together for ease of com-
parison, we get:
Case I Case II
contract price $50 $50
market price at time of formation $55 $45
cover price $70 $70
expectation measure $20 $20
lost-opportunity reliance measure $15 $25
In both Case I and Case II the argument for the expectation mea-
sure is the same. If Seller had delivered the widgets as promised, Buyer
would have paid $50 for them. Because of Seller's breach, Buyer had to
pay $70. t10 In other words, Seller's breach caused $20 of damage to
109. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. At the time most reliance losses are
incurred, the relying party does not expect to be reimbursed for these losses; rather, he hopes
that the sum of these losses will be less than the sum of the benefits he will receive from the
other party's performance. One can say that, but for the defaulting party contracting with the
plaintiff, there would be no loss. In this sense, however, there is shared responsibility, since if
the plaintiff had not contracted with the defendant, there would have been no loss either.
From this point of view, the defendant was no more responsible than the plaintiff for the loss.
110. Using actual cover prices makes the calculation of the expectation loss as simple as
possible. If Buyer had not actually covered, the expectation measure would be the difference
between the contract price and the market price at the time and place that Buyer learned of the
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Buyer."' While the expectation measure is the difference between the
contract price and the cover price, the reliance measure might be seen as
the difference between the market price at the time of contract formation
and the cover price-that is, $15 in Case I and $25 in Case II. The
argument is that if Seller had not come along then Buyer would have
paid the existing market price, but because of Seller's promise Buyer had
to pay $70. Thus, Seller's promise and breach caused $15 (Case I) or $25
(Case II) of damage to Buyer.
112
Although the two cases are theoretically parallel, the assumption
that true reliance loss is measured by the difference between the market
price and the cover price is more likely to be warranted in Case I than in
Case II. It is reasonable to conclude that in most cases if Seller had not
offered Buyer a below-market price, Buyer would have had to resort to
the less advantageous market price. On the other hand, it is less likely to
be true that if Seller had not offered Buyer an above-market price, Buyer
would have contracted at the more advantageous market price. In the
latter situation, Buyer would not have contracted with Seller if Buyer
had known what the market price was. Can we say that if Seller had not
made her offer, Buyer would have discovered a better one?
It thus seems less likely in Case II that Buyer would have contracted
at the market price if Buyer had not contracted with Seller. Therefore, a
decision to award $15 in Case I but not to award $25 in Case II might be
based on the suspicion that the true reliance loss in Case II was not $25
(but perhaps $20, based on the assumption that if Buyer had not con-
tracted with Seller at $50, he would have contracted with someone else at
$50).
Cases I and II can fairly be distinguished. In Case I the defaulting
Seller made a promise to the Buyer that was more advantageous to the
Buyer than those available elsewhere. Awarding only the reliance loss
breach. See U.C.C. § 2-713 (1978). Buyer need not use the money to purchase the widgets. A
court will be satisfied as long as Buyer had the ability to purchase the promised widgets. In all
cases, I am assuming away all transaction costs and incidental losses.
I 11. The reference here is to "causation" in a factual, as opposed to a legal, sense. The test
of causation has been variously described, but the basic idea is captured by the phrase "but
for"- but for the causal event, the result would not have occurred. See, e.g., Mather, supra
note 107, at 34 n.52; see also D. DOBBS, supra note 97, at 148-50. Using the "but for" test, it
follows from the facts in the text that "but for" Seller's breach, Buyer would not have lost $20.
112. Notice that the assumption underlying the lost-opportunity reliance calculation
might be wrong. In Case I the assumption is that if Buyer had not contracted with Seller,
Buyer would have paid the higher $55 market price for the widgets. In Case II the assumption
is that if Buyer had not contracted with Seller, Buyer would have paid only the $45 market
price for the widgets. If either assumption is wrong as a factual matter, then the calculation of
the true reliance loss is wrong.
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requires Seller to protect Buyer from all harm resulting from Seller's
making and later breaking her promise, but does not require Seller to
preserve for Buyer the extra advantage Seller promised. In Case II the
defaulting Seller made a promise to the Buyer that was less advantageous
to the Buyer than those available elsewhere. Awarding only the expecta-
tion loss requires Seller to protect Buyer from all harm resulting from
Seller's breach, but does not require Seller to pay the difference between
her promise and the more advantageous (to Buyer) alternative price. In
simpler terms, Seller does not have to pay extra for her own bad deal,
and she does not have to pay for Buyer's bad deal either.
C. Summary
To summarize, in some situations 1 3 appealing arguments can be
made for awarding reliance damages that exceed expectation, even
though doing so would place the plaintiff in a better position than if the
defendant had performed. But even those sympathetic to the reliance
measure would probably agree that in many cases of contract breach it is
hard to justify awarding more than expectation damages. We must then
ask whether the conclusion that the expectation measure often should act
as a ceiling on reliance damages casts doubt on the theoretical proposi-
tion that the goal of contract damages should be to protect the reliance
interest. In my view, when the case in which reliance exceeds expecta-
tion is compared with the more usual situation in which reliance is less
than expectation, the two cases appear sufficiently different to justify dif-
ferent remedial treatment."14
IV. Implementing the Lost-Opportunity Reliance Measure
The fundamental question we have been attempting to answer is
this: What, ideally, should be the goal of contract remedies? Should it
be to remove the negative effects on the plaintiff when a contract is made
and then broken? Or should it be to ensure that the plaintiff receives the
equivalent of what was promised to him in the contract? I have argued
113. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 99-103 & 105.
114. Consistency, like equality, is an elusive concept that lacks content until it is deter-
mined whether the similarities or the differences are more important for purposes of compari-
son. See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
For example, it is possible to argue that the expectation measure has an analogous consis-
tency problem. The expectation measure attempts to place the plaintiff in the position he
would have occupied had the contract been performed. But few would argue that the expecta-
tion principle should be followed if the breach benefited the plaintiff, since that would require
the innocent party to pay damages. Does a zero floor on recovery cast doubt upon the selec-
tion of the expectation principle as the goal of contract damages?
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that we should not employ state power to force a defaulting promisor to
do more than place the promisee in the position he would have occupied
had the promisor never made the promise in the first place.' 15 However,
before concluding that courts should adopt the lost-opportunity reliance
measure in place of the expectation measure as the standard remedy for
breach of contract, we must consider whether such a change would entail
added costs that might outweigh the benefits.
116
A. Calculating Expectation and Lost-Opportunity Reliance Damages:
Problems of Valuation
(1) The Expectation Measure
Placing a value on lost expectation resulting from breach of contract
requires a headlong plunge into the world of the subjunctive. Judges
must determine how much better off (than he is now, after the breach)
the plaintiff would have been had the contract been fully performed.
This inquiry can be broken down into three parts: 1) What would have
been the value to the plaintiff of the defaulting party's performance?
2) What incidental and consequential losses would have been avoided?
3) What savings did the plaintiff realize by not having to complete his
own performance of the contract?
It is often difficult to determine what the value to the plaintiff of the
115. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
116. It should be noted that the discussion of problems in valuing the expectation measure
deals with the theory of the expectation measure (i.e., how much money is necessary to place
the plaintiff in the position he would have occupied had the contract been performed). In
practice, of course, courts employing the expectation measure often place limitations on it so
that even a plaintiff who is successful in urging an expectation claim will not be as well off as
he would have been if the contract had been performed. He will not recover his attorney's fees
or other costs of litigation, damages not reasonably foreseeable by the defendant, damages not
provable with a reasonable degree of certainty as to amount, or damages that he could have
avoided through reasonable efforts. At least one commentator has pointed to this failure to
protect the true expectation interest as a justification for awarding supercompensatory dam-
ages in contract. See Farber, Economic Efficiency, supra note 49, at 1445.
Similarly, the analysis of valuation problems presented by the lost-opportunity reliance
measure assumes the pure form of the reliance goal (to put the plaintiff in the position he
would have occupied had there never been a contract with the defendant), and not the reality
of how courts implement the measure. In practice, courts employing the reliance measure
generally restrict themselves to out-of-pocket losses (disregarding the concept of lost opportu-
nity), and even then award only those losses that were incurred reasonably or could not rea-
sonably have been avoided.
A discussion of the doctrines limiting contract damage recoveries in expectation and reli-
ance is beyond the scope of this Article. It should be recognized, however, that there is a
danger that the theoretical analysis and argument for the reliance measure will be used to
justify the real-life reliance option that falls far short of protecting the true reliance interest.
The following subsection examines only the valuation problems inherent in the efforts to pro-
tect the theoretical (full) expectation or reliance interests.
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defendant's performance would have been had there been no breach.
The degree of difficulty depends upon the type of transaction and
whether the defaulting party is the buyer or the seller.' 1 7 If the buyer is
the defaulting party and was to purchase with money, then there is no
valuation problem and the value of the defaulting buyer's performance to
the seller is the unpaid contract price. But if the buyer was to purchase
with services or goods or anything other than money, the difficulty of
valuation depends upon the existence of a market for the consideration
the buyer was to have furnished. If there is a market for the considera-
tion, the value to the seller of the buyer's performance is that market
value. 18 If the seller is the defaulting party, the magnitude of the valua-
tion problem will depend again upon whether a market exists for the
items to be sold. If there is no market-if the items are unique-then the
judge must face the difficult task of coming up with a monetary value to
the buyer of the seller's performance that was promised but not
delivered.
In addition to losing the value of the defaulting party's performance,
the victim of a breach of contract may suffer other losses that would not
have occurred had the contract been performed. Such "incidental" or
"consequential"' 1 9 losses might include expenses of cover or resale, or
other out-of-pocket expenses incident to the breach, as well as lost profits
on resale, personal injuries caused by breach of warranty, or other losses
incurred in consequence of the breach. To the extent that these losses
can be characterized as "out-of-pocket," they generally are easier to
value than lost gains, although the court still must be convinced that
these losses would not have been incurred had the contract been
performed.
117. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 788-98. Whether the type of transaction affects the diffi-
culty of measuring expectation loss depends primarily upon where the object of the contract
falls on the continuum between unique items at one extreme and completely fungible commod-
ities at the other. The more nearly unique the subject matter of the contract, the more difficult
it is to place a value on its loss.
118. Although the seller may value the consideration itself above its market value, he, by
definition, will not value the furnishing of that consideration more highly than the price (in-
cluding transaction costs) at which he could obtain that consideration elsewhere.
119. The term "incidental damages" is used in the Uniform Commercial Code to refer to
expenses reasonably incurred by the victim of a breach as a result of the other party's breach.
See U.C.C. §§ 2-710, -715(1) (1978). The term "consequential damages" is used in the Uni-
form Commercial Code to refer to losses suffered by the victim of a breach (apparently limited
to an innocent buyer) as a result of the seller's breach which could not reasonably have been
prevented by cover or otherwise. See id. § 2-715(2). Although the definitions are vague, appar-
ently the distinction between incidental and consequential damages is basically the difference
between expenditures and other kinds of losses (not including the contract price/market price
differential).
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Finally, under the expectation measure, courts must inquire whether
the plaintiff realized any savings that he would not have realized if the
contract had been performed. The most important item in this category
is usually the value to the plaintiff of not having to perform his side of the
contract. As was the case for valuing the defaulting party's performance,
valuing the nondefaulting party's performance may be easy if that per-
formance is the payment of money. If, for example, the seller commits a
breach, and the buyer for money has not fully performed, the value of
performance saved will be the unpaid contract price. If the buyer has
breached and there is a market for the items to be sold, the value of
performance saved will be the market price (or the resale price) of the
items not delivered.
(2) The Reliance Measure
The primary reason that judges give for invoking the reliance mea-
sure is the difficulty of placing a value on lost expectation. 120 The reliance
measure generally employed, however, is not the theoretical reliance
measure (giving full effect to lost opportunity), but rather an out-of-
pocket losses formula. 121 A reliance measure limited to out-of-pocket
expenditures usually presents relatively minor valuation problems.
Although cases sometimes present losses that are difficult to value (e.g.,
injuries suffered because of breach of warranty), 122 judges do not have to
explore the world of what might have been. Although in some situations
the expectation figure will be easier to determine than the out-of-pocket
reliance figure, 123 in many cases the reason for choosing the out-of-
120. See, e.g., Hector Martinez & Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106, 108 n.3
(5th Cir. 1979); Kizas v. Webster, 532 F. Supp. 1331, 1332 (D.D.C. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 707 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Healy, 176 Conn. 97, 106, 405 A.2d 54, 59
(1978); Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 586, 296 N.E.2d 183, 188 (1973); Earl Dubey &
Sons v. Macomb Concrete Corp., 81 Mich. App. 662, 679-80, 266 N.W.2d 152, 160 (1978).
See generally Hudec, Restating the "'Reliance Interest, " 67 CORNELL L. REV. 704 (1982).
121. See, e.g., L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182, 188-89 (2d Cir.
1949); H.M.O. Sys., Inc. v. Choicecare Health Servs., Inc., 665 P.2d 635, 639-40 (Colo. App.
1983).
122. The difficulties involved in measuring reliance losses are basically the same as the
valuation difficulties in determining tort damages. When courts in tort cases go beyond com-
pensation for losses incurred to compensate for gains prevented, valuation problems become
more difficult. See generally Leubsdorf, Remediesfor Uncertainty, 61 B.U.L. REV. 132 (1981).
123. The clearest case is when the lost expectation is a sum of money. For example, con-
sider the case of a real estate broker who spends weeks tracking down a piece of property for
buyer B, then sets up the deal and, at the last minute, B refuses to pay the commission. Deter-
mining the broker's reliance damages attributable to the weeks of wasted effort might be both
difficult and speculative, but his expectation damages (Le., his commission) are known with
certainty.
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pocket reliance measure is precisely because it presents fewer valuation
problems.
When the concept of lost opportunity is included in the reliance
measure, reliance becomes even more difficult to value than expectation
in precisely those cases in which courts seek an alternative to the difficult
expectation measure. First, consider the problem of valuing lost per-
formance. For expectation, we had to ask the hypothetical question:
What would have been the value to the plaintiff of the defendant's com-
pleted performance of the contract? Under a lost-opportunity reliance
measure, the question again must be posed in the subjunctive: What
would have been the value to the plaintiff of the performance of the alter-
native contract, if any, that the plaintiff would have entered into had he
not entered the contract with the defendant? This question generally will
be more difficult to answer than the expectation question. Although both
questions are hypothetical ones, for lost-opportunity reliance we must
value the loss of performance of a (hypothetical) forgone contract rather
than of the actual contract that was formed and then broken. 124
The valuation of the lost expectation of the forgone contract in-
volves all the same difficulties that are involved in the search for the
value of the lost expectation of the original contract, as well as a number
of additional problems. To value the expectation of the nondefaulting
party if he had not entered into the broken contract, we must determine
whether another opportunity did in fact exist for the nondefaulting party.
If so, was he aware of it? Would he have taken that opportunity if he had
not contracted with the defendant? What would the terms of that alter-
native contract have been? Would the other party to the alternative con-
tract have performed? 125 All these questions must be answered to arrive
124. I am using the term "hypothetical," here and elsewhere in this Article, to mean "not
having occurred in fact." For example, an "actual" cost or loss is one that has been incurred
or suffered in the real world. Actual costs or losses may present severe valuation problems, but
they do not require any speculation about the probability of occurrence. "Hypothetical" costs
or losses are those that might have been incurred or suffered had things in the real world
happened differently, or those that might occur in the future.
125. The issue of whether an alternative contract would have been performed raises fur-
ther complications. If our theoretical goal is full protection of the lost-opportunity reliance
interest, then we must ask what benefit the plaintiff would have derived from the contract he
would have entered into if he had not contracted with the defendant. If the alternative con-
tractor would not have performed either, then presumably the plaintiff has not lost anything
more than he would have lost had he never contracted with the defendant-that is, lost-oppor-
tunity damages would be zero.
Assume, however, the existence of a third opportunity that the plaintiff would have con-
tracted for had he not contracted with the defendant or the first alternative contractor. As-
sume further that the damages measure to be applied is the lost-opportunity reliance measure.
Under these assumptions, had the plaintiff contracted with the first alternative contractor (who
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at a figure for the lost expectation of the forgone contract; fixing a figure
for the lost expectation of the contract that was actually formed (and
then broken) is far less difficult by comparison.
The concept of lost opportunity similarly complicates valuing inci-
dental and consequential reliance damages. These damages consist of
losses (other than the lost value of performance of the forgone contract)
that would not have occurred if the plaintiff had not contracted with the
defendant.126 Under a lost-opportunity reliance measure, lost gains, as
well as out-of-pocket losses, must be considered. For example, consider
consequential damages consisting of profits lost by a retail store because
of a construction company's failure to meet a contractually established
completion deadline. These lost profits would constitute part of the
store's lost expectation, assuming that they would have been earned had
the contract been performed as promised. 127 A reliance measure based
on out-of-pocket expenditures would avoid the difficult task of valuing
these lost profits.128 But a lost-opportunity measure would consider the
possibility that the store would have contracted with another construc-
tion company if it had not contracted with the defendant, and lost profits
would reenter the calculation. The only difference between the lost-op-
portunity reliance calculation and the lost-expectation calculation is that
the former requires the additional step of determining what the terms of
the alternative contract would have been. Thus, incidental and conse-
quential damages are at least as difficult, and often more difficult, to cal-
culate under a lost-opportunity reliance measure than under an
expectation measure.
also would not have performed) the plaintiff would have been entitled to damages from the
first alternative contractor based on the value of the lost opportunity to contract with the
second alternative contractor. Thus, if a lost-opportunity measure is in place, the plaintiff
should be entitled to the value of the lost opportunity if any alternative contractor would have
performed, but would be denied the value of the lost opportunity if all alternative contractors
would not have performed (Le., when some external intervening event makes it impossible for
anyone to fulfill a contract similar to the one breached). See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 7,
at 1445.
126. This proposition results from a simple adaptation of the definitions of incidental and
consequential damages, see supra note 119, from the expectation measure to the reliance
measure.
127. It should be kept in mind, of course, that saying that these lost profits constitute part
of lost expectation does not necessarily mean that they will be recoverable under an expecta-
tion measure. Recoverable expectation damages may be limited by the concepts of foresee-
ability, certainty, mitigation, and other limiting doctrines. See supra note 116.
128. In fact, avoidance of the need to calculate lost profits is one of the main reasons that
courts invoke the reliance measure. Courts find it convenient to resort to the reliance measure
when the "lost profits" are too uncertain to be calculated fairly and accurately. See supra
notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
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The same conclusion applies to the calculation of savings realized
because of breach. Since the goal of the lost-opportunity reliance mea-
sure is to approximate the position that the plaintiff would be in had he
entered into an alternative contract, we must subtract from the benefit he
would have received under that contract the costs that he would have
incurred. The most important of these costs is the cost of the plaintiff's
own performance of the alternative contract. This cost was averted when
the plaintiff contracted with the defendant instead of entering into the
alternative contract. This figure is a hypothetical one, but so is the corre-
sponding figure under the expectation measure. There is, however, an
added level of speculation involved here that is not involved under the
expectation measure. Under expectation, the terms of the contract are
established, and the only question concerns the value to the nondefault-
ing party of not having to complete performance under those terms. But
in the case of the forgone contract, we must first speculate about the
terms of the forgone contract and then ask what the value is to the non-
defaulting party of being relieved of the obligation to perform those
terms. 129
To summarize, a comparison of the valuation problems involved in
calculating the expectation measure and the lost-opportunity reliance
measure reveals that, although both measures often require answers to
difficult hypothetical questions, the lost-opportunity measure presents an
additional layer of problems not involved in the expectation measure.
For expectation, we must figure out the position that the plaintiff would
have been in had the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant
been performed. For lost-opportunity reliance, we have to speculate
about the terms of a contract (if any) the plaintiff would have entered
into had he not contracted with the defendant. Only after we have at-
tempted this difficult task can we turn to the expectation question of
what position the plaintiff would have been in had this alternative, for-
gone contract been performed.
The discussion of valuation problems in this section suggests that a
key factor in determining how difficult it will be to measure both expecta-
tion and lost opportunity is the extent to which there is a market for the
items to be exchanged. The following propositions should be evident:
129. I am assuming here that the failure of one party to perform the contract will excuse
the other party's duty to perform. Although this is generally the case, I should note here my
recognition that it is possible to have independent promises such that each party's failure to
perform subjects him to damages but does not terminate the other party's duty to perform.
See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 97, at 432; 3A A. CORBIN, A COMPREHEN-
SIVE TREATISE ON THE RULES OF CONTRACT LAW §§ 637, 654 (1960); 6 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 813 (3d ed. 1962).
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As the market for the items to be exchanged improves: (1) it becomes
easier to calculate lost expectation; (2) it becomes easier to calculate lost
opportunity; and (3) the difference between the two measures decreases
(until, under perfect market conditions, they are the same).
At this point, Fuller and Perdue's argument that the expectation
measure is best defended as an attempt to approximate the lost-opportu-
nity reliance measure130 (what Eisenberg calls the "surrogate cost" argu-
ment)' 3 ' seems persuasive. For the lost-opportunity measure to be
applied as a realistic alternative to the expectation measure, there must
be some certainty in identifying and quantifying the lost opportunity.
Usually this means that there must be a market for the subject matter of
the contract. But if there is a market, the expectation measure is a good
approximation of the lost opportunity. Conversely, lost opportunity dif-
fers significantly from lost expectation only when there is no market, or a
poorly functioning market, and in that event the value of the lost oppor-
tunity becomes problematic.
Are there exceptions to these generalizations? Are there any cir-
cumstances in which the expectation and lost-opportunity reliance meas-
ures are significantly different, and in which that difference can be
determined with reasonable confidence and without prohibitively high
costs? Are there situations in which the lost-opportunity reliance mea-
sure should be considered not just as a theoretical goal, but also as the
preferable measure of damages in actual cases? The next subsection dis-
cusses the possibilities for practical use of the lost-opportunity reliance
measure.
B. Possible Uses of the Lost-Opportunity Reliance Measure
For the lost-opportunity reliance measure 132 to be a practical alter-
130. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 60-66.
131. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 787.
132. In their excellent and illuminating article, Cooter and Eisenberg set forth their views
on when courts should employ the expectation measure and when they should resort to the
reliance measure. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1459-75. They recognize that reliance
protection and administrative considerations provide much of the support for the expectation
measure. But they go on to say that reasons of fairness and efficiency generally support use of
the expectation measure even when it differs significantly from the reliance measure. Id. at
1475. This is where we part company. Their efficiency argument seems to be not much more
than the efficient-breach argument made by many others and criticized in this Article. See
supra section II.B(1). Their fairness argument is based on the notion that courts should gener-
ally award the amount of damages that the parties themselves would have agreed to. In my
view they do not make a convincing case that parties would agree to expectation damages
when those damages would significantly exceed true reliance loss, if that loss could be calcu-
lated with reasonable ease.
In a section entitled "The Limits of the Expectation Principle," Cooter and Eisenberg give
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native to the expectation measure rather than merely a theoretical con-
struct, we must identify situations in which it is both feasible and
worthwhile to implement it. At a minimum, the additional costs of cal-
culating the value of lost opportunity must be less than the difference
between the lost-opportunity and expectation measures. At least three
types of situations might meet this criterion. The first is when it is possi-
ble to point to a specific offer or offers that the plaintiff declined because
of the defendant's offer. The second situation involves a sale or ex-
change of something having a generally recognized market price, but in
which the contract price deviates significantly from the market price.
The third situation is one in which we can be reasonably confident that
the value of the lost opportunity is zero, either because the breach follows
the promise so quickly or for other reasons. Although these three trans-
action types are not mutually exclusive, for purposes of analysis they will
be discussed separately.
(1) Specifically Identifiable Forgone Contracts
Assume that a contractor submits a bid for construction work in
response to a widely disseminated solicitation from a developer. This bid
turns out to be the lowest of the several otherwise equivalent bids, and
the developer notifies the contractor that her bid has been accepted. A
month later, the contractor discovers an error in the calculation of her
bid, and attempts to withdraw the bid. The developer refuses to allow
the withdrawal, and informs the contractor that he will hold the contrac-
tor to her original promise. The contractor then repudiates the deal.
The developer hires someone else to do the job and sues the contractor
for damages.
Assume that the contractor's bid was $80,000, the next lowest bid
was $100,000, and the price under the replacement contract (the lowest
price obtainable at the time the developer learned of the contractor's re-
pudiation) was $110,000. Both the lost expectation ($30,000) 133 and the
two examples of situations in which expectation damages should not be awarded. Cooter &
Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1471-75. Both involve consumer-defendants. Although I agree
with the authors' suggested results in those cases, I find some of the analysis distinguishing
those cases from similar commercial cases unpersuasive. Cooter and Eisenberg strive to save
the expectation principle as the goal of contract remedies by distinguishing away cases in
which the principle yields particularly harsh results. My approach is to say that the only
reasons for preferring expectation are administrative ones, and that we should not hesitate to
abandon expectation whenever we are reasonably sure that it has ceased to be the best way to
protect reliance. See also Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 785-98; supra note 84 and accompanying
text.
133. The expectation measure would be the difference between the amount of the original
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lost opportunity ($10,000) 13 4 are easily calculable. Under these facts, the
greatest practical obstacles to use of the lost-opportunity measure are
removed. Here we know: (1) that an alternative opportunity existed and
what the terms of that opportunity were; (2) that the plaintiff-developer
knew about that opportunity and probably would have taken advantage
of that opportunity had it not been for the defendant-contractor's lower
bid; and (3) that performance of that forgone contract would have
yielded a benefit to the developer when compared with what that devel-
oper actually had to do. All these normally difficult conclusions follow
rather easily from the fact that another acceptable bid was submitted for
the same work.135 Even under these facts, however, to award the
$10,000 reliance loss the court may have to assume that the next lowest
bidder would have performed fully if her bid had been accepted. 13
6
What objections can be made to the choice of the lost-opportunity
measure over the expectation measure in this mistaken-bid situation?137
One argument is that the reliance measure will reduce the incentive for
people submitting bids to make sure that those bids do not contain any
mistakes. But how much deterrence do we want in this situation? As-
suming that those submitting bids will respond to incentives created by
damages levels, 138 presumably we would want to deter mistakes up to the
point at which the cost of avoiding them equals the amount of loss
caused by them. But we then have to decide what we mean by "loss."
Does "loss" include lost expectation or only losses measured against the
status quo ante? We have thus merely restated the original question.
A fairness argument could be made that since it was the contractor
bid ($80,000) and the amount the developer had to pay after breach ($110,000). The $30,000
figure assumes there were no incidental or consequential damages.
134. The lost-opportunity reliance measure would be the difference between the amount of
the next lowest bid ($100,000) and the amount the developer had to pay after breach
($110,000). Again, I am assuming there were no incidental or consequential damages, and no
psychological harm resulting from the original bid and its breach.
135. But see Comment, Once More into the Breach: Promissory Estoppel and Traditional
Damage Doctrine, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 559, 569-71 (1970) (pointing out the dangers of applying
the lost-opportunity analysis to the subcontractor's-mistaken-bid situation).
136. Theoretically, the $10,000 figure would have to be discounted by the probability that
the next lowest bidder would have defaulted, unless you assume that lost-opportunity reliance
damages would be recoverable for that breach, in which case you would have to consider the
third lowest bid-and so on. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. In most cases, how-
ever, there would be no satisfactory way to arrive at such a probability figure. Unless there is a
reason to suspect that this particular party would not have performed if he had been awarded
the contract, this factor probably should be ignored, and the nondefaulting party should re-
ceive the full value of the lost opportunity.
137. Edward Yorio explores the same question in Yorio, supra note 60, at 1422-23.
138. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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who made the promise and the mistake, the contractor should bear the
loss resulting from the mistake. Even accepting this argument, however,
we again must determine what is meant by "loss." It seems "fair" to
make the contractor restore the developer to the position he would have
been in had the contractor not submitted a bid in the first place, but not
to award the developer a remedy that would place him in a better posi-
tion than he would have been in had there been no mistake. Thus in the
mistaken-bid situation the difficulties of calculating the lost-opportunity
remedy are sufficiently removed to warrant its selection if one chooses
reliance as the theoretical goal of contract remedies.
The mistaken-bid situation is not the only one in which it might be
possible to identify with some confidence the "next best offer." If there is
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of this available alternative,
there is no reason why the result should be different just because there
was no formal solicitation of bids. On the other hand, a damages mea-
sure based on a determination of the amount of the next best offer might
lead to difficult problems of proof. For example, assume that expectation
were to remain the standard measure of contract damages, but that a
lesser lost-opportunity reliance award would be substituted if the defend-
ant could prove with some reliability the existence and amount of the lost
opportunity. Although the defendant would have the burden of proof, it
would be the plaintiff who would have the relevant information. Under
these circumstances, the plaintiff would have an incentive to withhold
information about other offers he had received.
To illustrate, assume that P as seller and D as buyer enter into a
contract for the sale of a used car for $500. Further assume that P had
another offer for the car from Q, who offered to pay $450. D fails to keep
her promise to pay $500 to buy the car, and P is able to resell the car for
$400 after learning of D's breach. The lost expectation amount is $100,
and the lost-opportunity reliance amount is $50. Thus it would be the
defendant who would seek to prove that the plaintiff had received the
$450 offer. Not only is this difficult for the defendant to do, but the
temptation it creates for the plaintiff to conceal the existence of other
offers makes one wonder whether it is worth the costs to employ a stan-
dard based on proof of the existence and terms of offers that were never
accepted.
If recovery of lost opportunity greater than lost expectation is al-
lowed, 139 the administrative problems may be even more troublesome.
Although in such a situation it would be the plaintiff who would seek to
139. See supra section III.
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prove the existence and terms of the forgone opportunity, and the plain-
tiff would have the information, there would be a danger of false testi-
mony of offers not really made. Thus, although in general the lost-
opportunity measure can be both administratively feasible and desirable
outside of the formal solicitation-of-bid situation, we should be alert to
the potential problems involved in calculating damage awards based on
the value of specific forgone offers.
(2) Substantial Deviation of Contract Price from Market Price
Another situation in which it might be feasible to employ the lost-
opportunity measure is when the contract price deviates significantly
from the market price. The reasons for the contract-market divergence
may have a significant effect on our inclination to award that differential
to the plaintiff. For example, if a buyer agreed to pay more than the
prevailing market price for an item, we may want to know whether the
seller was simply a shrewd negotiator, the buyer chose not to shop
around, the buyer placed a special trust in this particular seller, or the
buyer had all the relevant information about the market but interpreted
it incorrectly.
Cases involving significant divergence between the contract price
and an established market price can be viewed as involving a "mistake"
in underlying assumptions. At least one party is probably mistaken
about the market price. In some cases of knowing advantage-taking, a
refusal to enforce the contract may be the most appropriate action. As-
sume that a knowledgeable antique dealer goes to a yard sale and spots a
valuable piece of antique furniture for which there is an established mar-
ket price of approximately $5000. The dealer offers to buy the antique
for $50, and the unknowing homeowner agrees. Before the seller delivers
the antique, she discovers its true value and repudiates the contract.
Traditional mistake theory might allow the seller in these circumstances
to rescind the agreement. 14°
By changing the facts, we can reduce our sympathy for the party
140. Comment b to § 152 of the Second Restatement of Contracts (dealing with mutual
mistake) states: "generally, mistakes as to market conditions or financial ability do not justify
avoidance under the rules governing mistake." Section 153 (dealing with unilateral mistake)
allows a mistaken party to avoid a contract if the mistake goes to a basic assumption of the
contract and has a material effect on the agreed exchange adverse to him, he has not accepted
the risk of the mistake either impliedly or explicitly, and either the enforcement of the contract
would be unconscionable or the other party had reason to know of the mistake or actually
caused the mistake. In this particular hypothetical, the mistaken seller might succeed under
§ 153, even though the mistake arguably goes to the market price of the furniture (which is
traditionally not protected by the mistake defense), since the buyer knew, or should have
known, that the seller was making a mistake.
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making the bad deal. Assume that the negotiations are between two an-
tique dealers; one dealer believes the item of furniture may turn out to be
one of exceptional value, and the other fails to recognize the value of
what he is selling. What should we do when the seller discovers that he
has made a mistake which, as an expert, he should not have made? Here,
excusing performance because of mistake seems harder to justify, but
some would argue that if the buyer had reason to believe that the seller
was making a serious mistake, rescission would be appropriate.
141
Others might respond that we should not rescue bad bargainers but
rather reward good bargainers by awarding full expectation damages to
the buyer. 142 It seems to be a fair compromise to refuse to give full effect
to the one-sided deal, but to require the defaulting seller to protect the
buyer from any reliance loss caused by the seller's mistake.
Finally, assume that neither party suspected that the contract price
deviated significantly from the market price, and that the parties had
equal bargaining power. This situation probably presents the most con-
troversial application of the lost-reliance principle instead of the expecta-
tion measure. Isn't one function of contract to allocate the risk of market
misjudgment? After all, the contract price could turn out to have been
either above or below the market price. Why use the market price as a
basis for calculating damages when it is the contract price that the parties
agreed to? My answer to these questions is that, even when one party
has not knowingly taken advantage of another, society does not have a
legitimate interest in implementing the private advantage of one citizen
at the expense of another.
It should be noted that difficulties may arise in determining whether
the contract price really does deviate significantly from the market price.
When we suspect that the buyer made a bad deal, we must be sure about
what the "market value" of the subject matter of the contract really is.
Some sellers may be more reliable than others, or other reasons may
make the deal with this particular seller worth more to the buyer than
the general market transaction would be. If it is the seller who made the
bad deal, and the buyer is buying with cash, we do not have to worry as
much about the value of the buyer's performance.
If we can determine at reasonable cost and with reasonable certainty
that the contract price significantly deviates from a generally established
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981); RFSTATEMENT OF Rt.*s-
TITuTION § 12 comment c, illustration 8 (1937); see also Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 778-85.
142. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 12 comment c, illustration 9 (1937); see also
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL SIuD. 1
(1978).
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and recognized market price, lost-opportunity reliance provides an ap-
propriate measure of damages for breach.
(3) Breach Without Reliance Loss
A third category of cases in which the expectation and lost-opportu-
nity reliance measures might differ significantly consists of situations in
which we can be reasonably sure that the victim of the breach of promise
has not suffered any reliance loss.143 Assume that X signs a contract to
buy a set of encyclopedias from Y, but changes her mind thirty seconds
later and asks Y to tear up the contract. Not only has neither party
begun performance of the contract (the contract is "wholly executory"),
but the repudiation came so quickly that we can conclude with some
confidence that Y has not lost any opportunity or suffered any other reli-
ance loss as a result of X's promise and its repudiation. The lost-oppor-
tunity reliance measure would result in no damages for breach.144 On
the other hand, the expectation measure would require X to pay to Y the
amount of Y's profit on the encyclopedias if the sale had gone through.
This hypothetical presents a clear choice between the expectation
and reliance measures of contract damages. Proponents of the expecta-
tion measure might argue that the parties know that the signing of the
contract is the legally significant event that gives rise to their contractual
responsibility, and thus the formation of the contract is the crucial point
in time. Under a reliance measure, however, the parties (particularly the
party contemplating breach) cannot be sure when the legally significant
time occurs. It is often not easy to tell when the nonbreaching party has
lost an opportunity. We are confident that there was no reliance loss in
the encyclopedias hypothetical because of the extreme rapidity of the re-
pudiation. 145 But other cases will not be as extreme, and courts will face
143. Eisenberg has argued that in wholly executory contract situations, we should not
blindly adopt the expectation measure in all cases, but should search for justifications for
awarding expectation damages. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 785-98. He identifies three justifi-
cations for awarding damages for breach of wholly executory contracts. The first justification
is protection against reliance loss. Id. at 787. He offers two additional justifications-facilitat-
ing planning and allocating risk-but does not develop them sufficiently to explain what they
add to the surrogate-cost justification. Eisenberg attempts to illustrate when each of his justifi-
cations is persuasive and when it is not by identifying four factual variables to look for in
particular cases. Eisenberg's discussion is interesting and instructive, but it is not intended to
exhaust the possible relevant variables nor the ways in which the variables he does identify
affect the presence or absence of reliance loss.
144. The victim of the breach would be no worse off than if no promise had been made,
except, perhaps, for psychological harm. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
145. It may be possible to be confident about the lack of lost opportunity even without an
immediate repudiation. The hypothetical of the photographer at the road race may be an
example. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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the difficult task of determining whether in fact an opportunity has been
lost. The expectation measure avoids this speculative inquiry and thus
provides a clearer and more understandable measure of liability for
breach of contract. The reliance measure weakens the message of the law
that the making of a promise is a solemn and important undertaking.'
46
Although this argument for the expectation measure has some force,
it overstates the distinction between the two remedies. In the first place,
under a reliance measure the signing of the contract is still the trigger to
liability. It is a prerequisite to liability for the reliance measure in the
same sense as it is for the expectation measure. It is simply not the only
requirement for liability; a reliance loss must follow the formation of the
contract. Of course, under the expectation measure the signing of the
contract is not the only requirement for liability either; there must be a
loss of profit or other expectation in order for the defaulting party to be
liable. Under either measure, it is possible to break a solemn promise
without being liable to the promisee. Under both measures, it is the oc-
currence of "loss" and not the mere formation and breach of a contract
that ultimately gives rise to liability.
The fact remains, however, that it often will be difficult to determine
whether the promisee has suffered a loss of opportunity after a breach by
the promisor. Because of this uncertainty, and because the expectation
measure often provides a good estimate of lost opportunity,147 it is tempt-
ing to employ the expectation measure in all executory contract situa-
tions for purposes of ease of administration and consistency, even if it
results in overcompensation in some cases.
However, if one believes in the principle that contract liability
should be measured by the amount of reliance loss, the question is
whether the added predictability and simplicity of the expectation mea-
sure offset the reduced accuracy that results when expectation is used as
a surrogate for reliance loss measurement. Although predictable liability
rules are valuable, it is doubtful whether many parties contemplating
breach of contract actually undertake a careful calculation of the amount
of damages payable if the matter is taken to court and liability is im-
posed. 48 Those parties who do take the time and effort to make such a
calculation could probably make a good estimate of lost-opportunity
damages as well.
One response to the problem of determining whether the costs of
146. See C. FRIED, supra note 32, at 19.
147. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. See generally supra subsection IV.A.
148. See generally Macauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
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calculating lost opportunity outweigh the benefits of increased accuracy
might be to place the burden of proof on the defendant to show that the
lost opportunity is less than the lost expectation. Presumably, if the costs
of proving the discrepancy outweigh the discrepancy itself, the defend-
ant will not challenge the expectation figure.
V. Conclusion
The question addressed by this Article is a basic one: What should
be the goal of remedies for breach of contract? In the 1930s, Fuller and
Perdue concluded that the arguments for going beyond compensation for
reliance loss to protection of expected gain were unpersuasive. Since
then, legal scholars have advanced moral and economic arguments in
support of the idea that protection against lost expectation should be the
desired object of remedies for contract breach. This Article has ex-
amined those arguments and concludes that a convincing case still has
not been presented for making protection of expectation the theoretical
goal of contract remedies.
As Fuller and Perdue recognized, however, a powerful instrumental
argument often supports the awarding of expectation damages.149 Even
if the proper theoretical goal is to protect the reliance interest, in a large
number of cases the best way to compensate reliance loss is to grant an
expectation award. An authoritative proclamation that from now on
only the reliance measure of damages would be employed would create a
danger of gross undercompensation of reliance loss because of the diffi-
culty contracting parties and judges would have in recognizing and prov-
ing what the full reliance losses actually were.
On the other hand, it would be worthwhile to declare explicitly that
protecting expectation is not the goal but simply a rough method of
achieving the goal of protecting against reliance loss. If we are careful
not to undervalue reliance loss, and if we conclude that in particular
cases we can, without inordinate costs, come closer to compensating for
reliance loss by a direct approach rather than by using the expectation
measure as a surrogate, °50 then we should abandon the expectation mea-
sure and award the value of the reliance loss including any lost
opportunity.
The only difference between the theoretical expectation measure and
the theoretical lost-opportunity reliance measure is that the expectation
measure awards to the plaintiff the extra advantage he would have re-
149. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 61-62.
150. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 787.
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ceived from the defendant beyond what he would have received else-
where. 15 ' Those arguing for enforcement of this extra advantage have
not demonstrated a compelling moral or economic justification for doing
so. On the other hand, I have not constructed a compelling case for
always protecting no more than the reliance interest. For me, the burden
of proof should be on the party seeking to employ public power to en-
force private advantage. My view reflects the belief, based only upon
experience and intuition, that enforcing private advantage helps the
strong at the expense of the weak-and the political conviction that using
public power to accomplish only that result is undesirable.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 19-31.
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